Vinal v. New England Telephone: Admission of PTSD Psychophysiologic
Test Results in a Civil Trial
Roger K. Pitman, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry
Scott P. Orr, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology
in Psychiatry
Harold J. Bursztajn, M.D., Associate Clinical Professor
of Psychiatry Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
AAPL Newsletter. 1993;
18(3): 67-69.
Background
Although it has been an official diagnosis only since 1980 [1],
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has already gained a prominent
place in American jurisprudence [2]. Because of the
controversy that this disorder Psychophysiologic Testing of the Plaintiff
can engender both in general and in individual cases [2],
objective means for establishing its presence or absence are desirable.
Pitman and Orr have recently proposed the potential forensic application
of psychophysiologic testing for PTSD [3]. The following
case represents to our knowledge the first time that physiologic test
results bearing on a PTSD claim have been admitted into evidence in an
American court. (See related story, p. 48-49,66-67.)
The Case
The plaintiff was a woman in her early thirties who was involved in a
head-on collision with an alleged hit-and-run driver who was traveling
down the wrong side of a divided interstate service road at night [4].
The plaintiff suffered back, neck, and knee injuries and was trapped
in her vehicle until the police arrived. Subsequently, the plaintiff
developed nightmares of the accident, driving fears, and other symptoms
consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD, for which she received psychotherapy
and medications. She was also hospitalized twice for depressive complaints.
The plaintiff's attorney obtained a comprehensive forensic psychiatric
evaluation, which included a traditional history and mental status examination,
observational studies of the plaintiff at home with her family, corroborative
interviews of husband and older daughter, and psychometric testing. The
plaintiff was referred for psychophysiologic testing to obtain data that
would be useful in educating the jury as to the extent of her physiologic
reactivity.
In the psychophysiology laboratory, the plaintiff's physiologic responses
during recollection of the automobile accident in question were measured
using a script-driven imagery technique described in detail elsewhere
[3,5]. Her responses to a series of
startling tone stimuli were also measured according to a published procedure
[6]. The results revealed exceptionally high physiologic
responses during the plaintiff's imagery of her accident in comparison
to her responses during imagery of her other personal life events, and
in comparison to the responses of published non-PTSD, and even PTSD,
research subjects during imagery of their personal traumatic events.
Her responses to the startling tones were also very high. Application
of a discriminant function derived from published research subjects'
data to the plaintiff's physiological responses during imagery yielded
a 99 percent probability of classification in the PTSD group.
Counsels' Argument Over the Admission of the Test Results
In Massachusetts, the legal standard for the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence is still the seventy-year-old Frye test [7],
which requires that the approach being used have gained "general
acceptance" in the relevant scientific community. In a pre-trial
motion in limine, the defense argued that the psychophysiologic
test results be excluded on the grounds that they were "an experiment" "highly
speculative and inflammatory." "comparable to... a lie detector," and
not generally accepted. Plaintiff countered that the acceptance of the
technique was demonstrated by its publication in a number of peer-reviewed
articles (referenced in 3), its citation in psychiatric
textbooks (e.g., 8), the absence of published criticism
against it and its implicit recognition in DSM-III-R criterion D.6., "physiologic
reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect
of the traumatic event" [9, p.250]. Plaintiff rebutted
the lie detector analogy by arguing that "the intention of physiologic
testing is to assess symptomatology, not truthfulness." Plaintiff
also pointed out that during a pre-trial deposition, defenses psychiatric
expert had testified that he had not seen any evidence that the plaintiff
experienced startle reactions.
The Judges Ruling and the Verdict
At the September 1993 trial, over defenses objection, the judge allowed
an expert who performed the psychophysiologic testing to present to the
jury graphs of the plaintiff's physiologic responses and to testify that
these indicated that the plaintiff met DSM-III-R PTSD criterion D.6 above,
as well as D.5, "exaggerated startle response." However, when
plaintiff's counsel attempted to ask the expert whether the physiologic
results could provide an estimate of the probability of PTSD, the defense
again objected. The judge ruled that more foundation for this portion
of the testimony was required. Believing that the physiologic evidence
already presented was sufficient and fearing the possibility of reversal
should the expert be allowed to present a probability figure, the plaintiff
did not pursue this inquiry.
The next day, the evaluating forensic psychiatrist presented his opinion,
which incorporated the psychophysiologic test results. Again, the calculated
probability of PTSD was excluded after defense objected. Upon the conclusion
of the plaintiff's case, the defense offered to settle for $200,000,
but plaintiff refused. The jury was apparently less impressed than the
defense by the psychiatric evidence, including the psychophysiologic
test results, because it awarded the plaintiff damages of only $35,000.
Discussion and Implications of a Recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
This case serves as an example of the different outcomes in the admission
of novel scientific evidence which might obtain under the application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as opposed to Frye. The
judge, applying the Frye standard, accurately perceived
that the general acceptance of testing for the presence of psychophysiologic
criteria for PTSD, as manifest in the codification in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual [1,9], was less
disputable than the general acceptance of using physiologic data to estimate
the probability of the PTSD diagnosis, given the latter technique's publication
in only a single article [3]. Had the judge applied
a Federal Rules-type standard, he would have been more likely to have
admitted the probability calculation.
In the recent celebrated case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow [10]
(See Daubert, pp.
66-67.) involving a claim of drug-induced birth defects, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Frye test was superceded by the 1975
adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence, thereby shifting the standard
for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in Federal jurisdiction
from general acceptance to relevance, to which the Supreme Court added
scientific validity. State jurisdictions are expected to follow suit.
The relevance of an objectively derived estimate of the probability of
PTSD in personal injury cases involving claims of mental damage is clear,
given the definition of "relevant evidence"
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence" (Rule 401).
Thus under a Federal Rules-type standard, the admissibility of a physiologic
probability estimate of PTSD is likely to come down to the judge's determination
of the soundness of the science that produces the estimate. The manner
in which judges, who are not scientists, will assess the validity of
scientific data remains to be determined in numerous cases across the
land, including those involving psychophysiologic testing for PTSD.
The disastrous jury award in this case ironically may provide reassurance
in one respect. Under Federal Rule 403, even if a court were to view
favorably the relevance and scientific validity of a psychophysiologic
test result for PTSD, it still could conceivably exclude this evidence
on the grounds of prejudice, if it were persuaded that the psychophysiologic
data would so dazzle the jury as to inappropriately overshadow other
relevant testimony. Clearly if other juries are anything like this one,
there is nothing to fear in this regard. Also, the chance of psychophysiologic
test results being ruled unduly prejudicial may be reduced if the results
are offered not as a stand-alone test, but rather as adjunctive to a
comprehensive forensic psychiatric evaluation [3].
Acknowledgements: Dr. Mark Greenberg, Professor Linda Saunders, and Attorney
Edward Wallace reviewed the manuscript and made helpful suggestions.
References
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Pitman, R.K., & Orr, S.P. (1993). Psychophysiologic
testing for post-traumatic stress disorder Forensic psychiatric application.
Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 21(1):37-52.
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Denise Vinal v. New England Telephone.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Superior Court Department. Lowell
Division, Civil Action No. 91-0564.
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Pitman, R.K., Orr, S.P., Forgue, D.F., etal.(1987).
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10.113S.Ct.2786.125 L.Ed. 2d 469 (1993).