Micro-Effects of Language on Risk Perception in Drug Prescribing Behavior
Harold J. Bursztajn, MD; Benzion Chanowitz, PhD; Thomas G. Gutheil,
MD; and Robert M. Hamm, PhD
Drs. Bursztajn and Gutheil are affiliated
with the Program in Psychiatry and the Law, Massachusetts Mental
Health Center, 74 Fenwood Road, Boston, MA 02115. Dr. Chanowitz is
affiliated with the Department of Psychology and the Graduate Center,
Brooklyn College, C.U.N.Y., New York, NY. Dr. Hamm is affiliated
with the Center for Research on Judgment and Policy, University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO. The authors wish to thank Prof. Miriam Schustack
of the Department of Psychology and Social Relations, Harvard University,
for helpful suggestions in the design of this study. This paper was
presented at Society for Medical Decision Making meetings, November
1983, Toronto. Abstract published in: Medical Decision Making Vol.
3, p. 539, 1983.
The decision to prescribe neuroleptics
for the treatment of psychosis involves a potentially tragic choice between,
on the one hand, a probability of psychosis and a probability of side
effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, on the other. In an experimental
paradigm, we examined this decision process. We hypothesized that linguistic
factors considered irrelevant under classical formulations of individual
choice behavior would have a significant effect on this decision. All
subjects were presented with a case vignette involving a potentially
psychotic patient Subjects were then asked what probability of tardive
dyskinesia they would either "accept" or "risk" in
order to prevent psychotic decompensation. In addition this factor was
crossed with a contextual factor that varied the patient's age. The effect
of "risk" versus "accept" language was evident in
significantly different patterns of decision making across age groups.
The data have important implications for clinical decision making, the
elicitation of informed consent, and the directions that the courts have
taken in malpractice and patient's rights cases.
The decision whether or not to prescribe a neuroleptic drug for a psychotic
patient represents an increasingly common source of anxiety for the psychiatrist
in light of emerging case law. [1-3] These drugs effectively
inhibit psychosis, but their use may induce tardive dyskinesia. How does
one weigh these risks and benefits in order to determine what is good
medical practice and what is medical malpractice? It was in the context
of this problem that the legal foundations were first established for
psychiatric patients' rights to refuse treatment. [4-6]
In another well-publicized case, Clites v.State of Iowa, [7,8]
a mentally retarded patient was awarded nearly $800,000 in damages for
neuroleptic-induced tardive dyskinesia. The physician's actions in this
case were judged to be negligent in part because treatment with neuroleptics
was not considered to be adequate care for the patient in question. However,
when weighing the risks and benefits of neuroleptic treatment, it is
unclear what would constitute a good clinical judgment strategy. Without
such guidance psychiatrists may be forced to practice "defensive
medicine" in order to avoid accusations of malpractice.
The process of prescribing drugs and the clinical judgment strategies
that underlie this prescribing behavior have become the focus of increasing
research interest. [9,10] Much of
this research is directed toward determining whether there is consistency
in prescribing behavior and, if so, the factors that govern the documented
consistency. A number of patient characteristics (e.g., age, sex, symptom
profiles) and physician characteristics (e.g., age, training, practice
size) have been found to affect prescribing behavior. [11,12]
However, such research has only demonstrated regularities in prescribing
behavior given certain physician or patient characteristics that remain
stable over time. Less attention has been paid to how prescribing behavior
might be systematically influenced by the manipulation of situational
variables.
This pilot study examines the effect that one such variable may have
on drug-prescribing decisions. The language in which a hypothetical drug-prescribing
decision was presented was varied in a way that should be irrelevant
by traditional standards of clinical practice and contemporary decision
theory. It was hypothesized that two distinct clinical judgment strategies
are available for difficult medical decisions. The micro-language manipulation
was designed to elicit these two strategies.
Subjects were asked either what probability of tardive dyskinesia (TD)
they would risk or what probability of TD they would accept in prescribing
a neuroleptic drug. It was hypothesized that the word "risk" would
make the dangers of the situation salient, and that subjects in the "risk" condition
would be made to feel solely and completely responsible for whatever
outcome might follow from their decision. With the word "accept," on
the other hand, the dangers of the situation would remain salient, but
in conjunction with other, equally relevant factors. It was hypothesized
that subjects in the "accept" condition would act on the assumption
that risks exist no matter what course of action is taken. These subjects,
therefore, would be better able to acknowledge and assess rationally
the risks in the hypothetical situation presented to them.
To demonstrate these patterns we exploited a relatively well-documented
finding regarding the relationship between TD and neuroleptic drugs.
Recent research [13,14] indicates
that advancing age is associated with increasing prevalence of TD for
patients receiving neuroleptic drugs. Hence, varying the age of the patient
should produce concurrent variation in drug prescribing decisions. Subgroups
within each of the two experimental groups (i.e., "risk" versus "accept")
received information that the patient was either young, middle-aged,
or old in an otherwise identical case vignette. We expected different
patterns of drug-prescribing behavior across patient age groups as a
function of the language employed in eliciting drug-prescribing decision.
Specifically, we hypothesized that subjects would either repress or act
out (in the "risk" case) or consider (in the "accept" case)
the anxieties that emerge in prescribing neuroleptic drugs to elderly
patients. The emergence of two distinct patterns across age would confirm
that two distinct judgment strategies do exist and can be preferentially
induced.
Method
Subjects were a group of 60 persons attending a Conference on Psychiatry
and the Law: Strategies of Malpractice Prevention. They included physicians
(N = 20), attorneys (N = 15), and other (e.g., registered nurses, social
workers; N = 25). The current study population was predisposed toward
a homogeneity of disciplinary responses by virtue of being post-tested
immediately following presentation on risk management by two of the co-authors
(H.B. and T.G.). We have addressed the issue of disciplinary role influences
on risk perception elsewhere. [15] Subjects were presented
with a brief case vignette of a psychotic patient that described costs
and benefits of prescribing a neuroleptic drug. The clinical part of
the vignette read as follows:
A [70-year-old] patient of yours becomes violently psychotic
when taking any less than a neuroleptic equivalent of 400 mg of Thorazine.
As you know, Thorazine is effective in reducing psychotic behavior, but
its continuing use is associated with tardive dyskinesia (involuntary
muscle spasm).
On different forms of the vignette, the age of the patient was varied
as 20 years old, 40 years old, or 70 years old. Subjects were then asked
to answer two questions with reference to this case. The first question
was designed to elicit how they were subjectively disposed to act in
this case in prescribing a neuroleptics drug that might induce TD. The
second question was designed to elicit their objective assessment of
the probability that this patient would develop TD if the neuroleptic
drug was prescribed.
The first question was worded in one of two ways. In one form, the question
was worded as follows:
What probability of tardive dyskinesia would you [risk] to prevent
recurrence of psychosis in this [70-year-old] patient? Circle one of
the numbers below.
In the other form, the question was worded, with one word changed, as
follows:
What probability of tardive dyskinesia would you [accept] to
prevent recurrence of psychosis in this [70-year-old] patient? Circle
one of the numbers below.
In answering one of the above questions, subjects were required to circle
the probability level of TD that they would be willing to risk/accept
in prescribing neuroleptic drugs. The presented levels ranged from 0%
to 100% by intervals of 10% (see Appendix).
Appendix
A [40-year-old] patient of yours becomes violently
psychotic when taking any less than a neuroleptics equivalent
of 400 mg of Thorazine. As you know, Thorazine is effective in
reducing psychotic behavior, but its continuing use is associated
with tardive dyskinesia (involuntary muscle spasm). What probability
of tardive dyskinesia would you [risk] to prevent recurrence
of psychosis in this [40 year-old] patient? Circle one of the
numbers below: |
|
low probability |
high probability |
|
0% |
10% |
20% |
30% |
40% |
50% |
60% |
70% |
80% |
90% |
100% |
|
|
Profession: _________________________ |
Years in profession: _________ |
Age: __________ |
Sex: _________ |
All subjects then received the same second question, which read as follows:
What is the likelihood that this patient will get tardive dyskinesia?
Subjects again were required to express their assessments of probability
in percentile form. By subtracting each subject's answer to the second
question from their answer to the first, the responses were adjusted
to represent whether (+) or not (-) the subjects would prescribe in this
situation. Subjects' responses to the second question were an expression
of their baseline assessments of the probability of inducing TD if the
patient received Thorazine. In subtracting this figure from the response
to the first question (that assessed the willingness to act in prescribing
the drug), we assessed the willingness of subjects to prescribe and thereby
take risks that either undershot or overshot the baseline probability
of inducing TD. This adjusted risk figure was used to compare the drug
prescribing behaviors of different subjects with different assessments
of the baseline probability of inducing TD.
These adjusted responses of the subjects were embedded in a 3 (age: 20,
40, or 70 years old) by 2 (language: risk or accept) between-subjects
design. An analysis of variance [16] was performed
to examine the pattern of subjects' responses. It was hypothesized that "risk" subjects
would be motivated to reduce uncertainty and anxiety; they would take
steadily decreasing risks with the increasing age of patient, in response
to the anxieties that attend the treatment of elderly patients. This
effect was hypothesized not to occur among "accept" subjects,
who would be induced to act under a "cooler" judgment strategy.
[17] Under the latter conditions, subjects might concede
that uncertainty exists regardless of which alternative is chosen. As
such, they would be willing to cope with rather than yield to the anxieties
that accompany the treatment of elderly patients.
Results
The primary dependent measure was the adjusted figure (i.e., each subjects'
response to question 1 minus the response to question 2) that represents
the probability of TD that each subject was willing to risk/accept in
prescribing a neuroleptic. A distinctive pattern of variation in this
measure emerges when subjects' responses across age groups are compared.
Table 1 presents these data. As can be seen, "risk" subjects
radically decrease the risks that they are willing to take with the increasing
age of patient, while "accept" subjects are willing to take
increasing chances. These data were subjected to a two-way analysis of
variance and yielded the predicted interaction effect, F(2,52) = 4.59,
p < .015. There were no main effects. That is, neither language nor age
of patient perse was responsible for variations in subjects' responses,
Rather, differences in micro-language induced different levels of willingness
to take chances as a function of the varying age of patient. The data
indicate that all subjects were aware that the probabilities for TD change
as a function of changing age, but that "risk" and "accept" subjects
used this perception differentially as a basis for action. Under "risk" versus "accept" conditions,
subjects employed different judgment strategies in order to arrive at
a drug-prescribing decision in a situation that becomes increasingly
exacerbated with the increasing age of the patient.
Table 1
Responses Across Age Groups |
|
20 yr old |
40 yr old |
70 yr old |
Subjective assess-
ment/action
question |
Accept
(x̄ = 42.67) |
33.33% |
41.82% |
52% |
Risk
(x̄ = 45.81) |
47.27% |
49.00% |
41% |
Objective Assess-
ment question |
Accept
(x̄ = 41.88) |
47.45% |
36.55% |
41.25% |
Risk
(x̄ = 39.98) |
24.50% |
35.92% |
59.10% |
Adjusted willing-
ness to take
chance of tar-
dive dyskinesis |
Accept |
-13.71% |
+5.27% |
+10.75% |
Risk |
+26.50% |
+10.74% |
-18.10% |
Discussion
The data in our pilot study indicate that prescribing behavior is affected
by the way in which risks are perceived and that the orientation toward
risks can be significantly affected by micro-language differences in
the presentation of the situation. Distinctive orientations foster different
patterns of response to the uncertainties and anxieties that are presented
in the situation, and language can be effective in producing one attitude
or the other. The inconsistent patterns of decision produced by the use
of "risk" versus "accept" cannot be accounted for
by the decision models of classical utility theory or its modem descendants.
[18,19] These models rely on context-independent
factors that do not distinguish between the "risk" and "accept" manipulations
that produced different patterns of decision across age.
Earlier work [20,21] has described
two paradigms for both medical practice and decision behavior. Under
the mechanistic paradigm, medicine is practiced with the assumption that
there are sharply defined causes responsible for observed pathologies
and that these pathologies can be unerringly treated by eliminating those
causes. Complete certainty is within reach through the strict use of
the classically defined experimental method. The practitioner continues
to search for "the cause" and "the proper treatment" until
certainty is achieved. Under the probabilistic paradigm, knowledge is
gathered about a range of factors that are probabilistically associated
with a given pathology. Complete certainty about either "the cause" or "the
proper treatment" is conceded to be an unrealistic goal from the
outset. Instead, one seeks relevant information while recognizing that
there is no completely satisfying solution to the problem of how to treat.
The search, then, is not driven by the attempt to achieve complete certainty.
We believe that these paradigmatic distinctions are at the root of the
inconsistent patterns of choice behavior among the "risk" and "accept" subjects.
Each word elicits a distinctive orientation to the dangers of a potentially
tragic situation. Under the "risk" condition, where complete
certainty is presumed to be an achievable goal, subjects act out the
anxieties that emerge when treating elderly persons. The practice of "defensive
medicine" thrives under such circumstances. For the prescriber,
an already dangerous situation involving psychotic patients and neuroleptic
drugs becomes all the more threatening, by the context-specific variation
of age, as the age of the hypothetical patient increases. Subjects are
less willing to intervene actively and therefore take fewer active risks
(i.e., they are willing to "risk" only a low probability of
TD).
Under the "accept" condition, the probabilistic orientation
is implicitly instituted and complete certainty is recognized as an unachievable
goal. From the outset, uncertainty is an ineliminable aspect of treatment.
The micro-language of "accept" seems to be effective in helping
subjects realize and consciously cope with the added uncertainties that
are introduced when treating an elderly patient, and to be able to balance
the benefit of psychosis control with the potential tragic outcome in
a younger person of being disfigured for life by tardive dyskinesia.
In weighing the merits of the two orientations, it is arguable that the
probabilistic paradigm elicited by the word "accept" is the
more productive framework, and that the pattern of drug prescribing displayed
by subjects in the "accept" condition constitutes better medical
practice. Despite the fact that the probability of inducing TD increases
with the age of the patient, it would appear to be an overriding consideration
that fewer chances should be taken with younger patients who have longer
lives ahead of them.
In summary, if micro-language differences are effective in altering risk
perception in risky situations, then in principle we have a tool in hand
for adjusting the amount of risk that persons are willing to assume in
such situations. Risks are psychologically more acceptable once it is
made clear, by the language that is used, that any chosen course of action
entails the acceptance of uncertainty. Under such conditions, the task
becomes one of minimizing the risks rather than avoiding them. If, however,
the language that is used implies that risks can in principle be completely
eliminated, then either people will engage in a futile search for a risk-free
course of action, or the risks will be denied, repressed, or acted out
as in the form of defensive medicine.
In suggesting that the manner in which the clinician frames the question
of costs and benefits of treatment and side effects will significantly
influence the decision strategy, one implication is that, when facing
decisions involving tragic choices, clinicians should ask themselves
the questions of treatment choice in both "risk" and "accept" terms.
This may be a useful corrective to the overemphasis on control and clinician
omnipotence when framing the question solely in anxiety-provoking
"risk" terms. By keeping in mind that in science some degree
of uncertainty must be accepted, the clinician can take a cooler look
at the relative merits of the available treatment options.
A clinician in this frame of mind can also use the informed consent process
as an opportunity for building a therapeutic alliance. [22]
Attention must be paid to the language of informed consent forms in which
patients are asked to risk side effects from a recommended course of
treatment. Too often these forms leave the impression that risk can be
avoided by abstaining from the treatment. An informed consent dialogue
that clarifies the need to accept the costs of any course of action (including
inaction) will allow for wiser consideration of treatment choices—by
both physician and patient. By fostering sound clinical decisions, increased
patient participation in decision making, and greater trust between patient
and physician, such a process stands to reduce both the fear and the
actuality of malpractice liability.
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