Malpractice Prevention Through The Sharing Of Uncertainty
Informed Consent and the Therapeutic Alliance
Uncertainty presents a commonly acknowledged threat to the doctor-patient
alliance [1]; anxious patients seeking doctors also
seek the reassurance of medical certainty. But anxiety about undiscovered
causes and undetermined outcomes sets doctor and patient apart if
both react defensively; even worse, anxiety over uncertainty may
evoke feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and worthlessness.
Increasingly, patients and families who experience tragic disappointments
in their expectations of medicine attempt to assuage their grief,
helplessness, and despair by suing — that is, blaming — the physician.
In doing so, they often fail to discriminate among errors of negligence,
other errors, natural variations, and acts of fate. Under the stress
of life-and-death decision making, physicians also readily experience
negative outcomes as blows to their sense of competence and professional
pride. In the midst of such tragedy the physician is tempted to terminate
the relationship, saying, "There is nothing more I can do." For
the patient, then, a malpractice suit becomes the mechanism by which
to force the "abandoning" physician to share both the responsibility
for the outcome and — less obviously — the experience of distress
and rage occasioned by suffering. [2]
Informed Consent: A Double-Edged Sword
At first sight, the informed-consent procedure seems to offer a way of
ameliorating these strains. Nonetheless, physicians by and large
have not welcomed informed consent. Besides viewing it as "red
tape" and the imposition of a legal constraint on the exercise
of professional judgment, physicians have expressed misgivings about
the clinical ramifications of informed consent. [3,4]
In fact, the clinical impact of informed consent is double-edged. [5,6]
Despite its positive effects of clarify ing options and stimulating mutual
understanding, the procedure is not without risk. It can bring to a crisis
latent problems that the patient may have in accepting uncertainty —
problems that can take two strikingly opposite forms.
At one extreme, calling attention to risks (especially in the chilling
style of an informed-consent form) can touch off feelings of helplessness
by crystallizing the patient's awareness that the situation really
is uncertain. At the other extreme, the seemingly authoritative list
of complications with their numerical probabilities, which lay persons
have been found to desire, [7] can be used as a
magical ritual to dispel the uncertainty. [8] Ironically,
such an overly tidy disclosure can inflate the magical hope that "all
bases have been covered," and disappointment may lead to malpractice
suits. The twin dangers, then, lie in exaggerating how little or
how much the physician knows.
Ideally, the clinical utility of informed consent lies in bridging the
gap between either of the two fantasies — helpless ignorance or omnipotent
certainty — and a more complicated reality. To achieve this goal,
however, physicians must stop thinking of informed consent as a formality
(the recital of options and signing of the form) and enter into it
with their patients as a process of mutual discovery. [9]
Informed consent as we envision it here is not an empty gesture toward
liability reduction but an interaction between physician and patient,
a dialogue intended not only to satisfy this legal requirement but
to do more as well. The real clinical opportunity offered by informed
consent is that of transforming uncertainty from a threat to the
doctor—patient alliance into the very basis on which an alliance
can be formed. 1 This is particularly important, since a sense of
working together with the doctor may be one of the major elements
in avoiding negative reactions to treatment. [10]
An approach to this problem is outlined below.
Practical Considerations
Understand the Origins of the Patient's Fantasies of Certainty
Patients invoke wishful or magical thinking as a defense against feelings
of helplessness. The fears, doubts, and actual disablements of illness
reactivate memories of childhood helplessness and, in turn, of the
grandiose and magical thoughts that are virtually the child's only
defense. When illness presents a threat to one's well-being — to
one's very being, in fact — one attempts to resolve the discrepancy
between the perception of powerlessness and the wish for omnipotence
by transferring the latter to the physician. The patient says to
the physician, in effect, "Okay, I am not perfect, but you will
make me good as new. I cede to you the magical powers of my infantile
self" [11] The patient thus forms with the
physician what psychiatrists call an "irrational" or "narcissistic" alliance,
in which the patient approaches the physician as child to parent
rather than as adult to adult. [12] In this context
the patient is simply not receptive to any disavowal of certainty
on the physician's part, hearing it instead as an alienating rejection
of the omnipotent, magical role scripted for the physician.
Magical notions of science play a key part in such fantasies of cure.
The physician is a representative of science, which is conceived
of (certainly in the unconscious but consciously in some cases) as
a source of absolutely certain knowledge. [1] Unfortunately,
the trust in scientific omnipotence may easily degenerate into paranoid
distrust: the patient, already a helpless victim of illness, now
feels like the helpless victim of an all-powerful science as well.
If the patient is allowed to remain in this dependent state, subsequent
outcomes of a disillusioning nature may lead to further regression
and refusal to assume responsibility for self-monitoring and self-care
or, regrettably, to litigation.
Empathize with the Patient's Unrealistic Wishes
The physician should resist what might seem the logical move of dismantling
the unrealistic foundation of the narcissistic alliance by confronting
it head-on; one cannot expect to take away the wishful thinking (and
the resulting unhealthy attachment to the physician) without providing
a different kind of comfort — and attempting a different kind of
alliance — in its place.
Paradoxically, the best way to effect this substitution is to empathize
with the patient's wish for certainty and with its specific manifestations
as understandable human reactions to a difficult and painful situation.
Explicit identification with the patient's fantasies is conveyed
through such remarks as, "I wish I could give you a medication
that was sure to have only positive effects" and "There
is just no guarantee you'll live through this — I wish there were," which
invite the patient to exchange idealization for identification. The
patient can now approach the physician not as a childhood fantasy
ideal but as another vulnerable human being facing — and hence, sharing
— the same uncertainty. The physician is linked with the realistic,
adult part of the patient in what is called a "rational"
alliance, with two adults collaborating to reach a reasonable agreement
based in reality. Instead of squaring off defensively against each other,
doctor and patient are brought together by the shared acknowl-edgment
of clinical uncertainty and of the fantasies used to deny it. [12]
Wean the Patient from the Fantasy of Certainty
Once the patient and physician are looking at the fantasy together, the
physician can guide the patient in seeing it for what it is. Indeed,
the very words used to establish the identification and alliance
between patient and physician can begin the work of separating the
patient from the fantasy. Expressions like "I wish it were possible
. . . ," even as they validate the wish as a wish, imply tactfully
that it is contrary to fact. Clarifying statements (e.g., "Many
people do believe that one can specify in advance every possible
complication of an operation") offer the patient tactful support
in taking a critical look at beliefs that he or she may share with "many
people." [13]
Having provided this emotional and interpersonal grounding, the physician
can proceed to the explicit disavowal of omnipotence and the substantive
education of the patient about uncertainty. Both the implicit and
explicit teaching separate the reality of human science from the
fantasy of godlike science. Now the patient is a participant-observer
rather than, say, simply the object of the physician's "experiment." It
must be stressed, though, that this alliance and the awareness it
generates rest on assurance of the physician's continuing availability
to share the uncertainty — expressed, for example, in statements
such as, "I'll be with you every step of the way." Implicit
in this statement is the promise of a continuing relationship, even
if there is a tragic outcome. When this promise is fulfilled, the
patient is less likely to feel a need to force the physician to share
the experience of the misfortune by means of a malpractice suit.
Note that our approach stresses the selection of what to say to patients
rather than such advice as taking more time with patients or telling
them more. In practice, less time is taken and more is understood:
sound efficiency of communication, not mere volume of words, is the
desideratum.
Conclusion
Informed consent need not be a mere formality with a limited medicolegal
function. Rather, it can be a focal point in establishing a therapeutic
alliance. Seen as a dialogue in which both the cognitive and affective
implications of uncertainty are acknowledged and shared, informed
consent is a powerful clinical tool. Through its use, helplessness
is replaced by a degree of control as the patient becomes a coexperimenter
rather than a passive object of experimentation. Hopelessness is
replaced by a degree of hope as the patient comes to see that uncertainty
does not imply irrationality, defeat, or abandonment. Finally, the
alliance between the patient and physician, instead of being Undermined
by the specious denial of uncertainty, is strengthened by the mutuality
of its acceptance.
The legal benefits flow from the clinical ones. The Usual perfunctory
approach to informed consent can be characterized as a form of defensive
medicine. Undertaken primarily to protect the physician from legal
liability, it often fails to do even that. In contrast, the therapeutic
use of informed consent to enlist the patient in an active alliance
with the physician discourages overly simplistic blaming and reduces
the alienation from the physician that leads the patient to seek
legal remedies for dissatisfaction. This is true malpractice prevention,
which offers the physician stronger legal protection by allowing
both doctor and patient to deepen their understanding while building
a supportive and trusting relationship — a relationship based not
on unrealistic certainty but on honesty in facing the uncertainty
inherent in clinical practice.
Massachusetts Mental
Health Center
Boston, MA 02115
Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D.
Harold Bursztajn, M.D.
Archie Brodsky, B.A.
Supported in part by a grant (5T01-MH-16460-03) from the National Institute
of Mental Health.
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