Malpractice Prevention Through
The Sharing Of Uncertainty
Informed Consent and the Therapeutic Alliance
Uncertainty presents a commonly acknowledged
threat to the doctor-patient alliance [1]; anxious patients
seeking doctors also seek the reassurance of medical
certainty. But anxiety about undiscovered causes and
undetermined outcomes sets doctor and patient apart
if both react defensively; even worse, anxiety over uncertainty may evoke feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and worthlessness.
Increasingly, patients and families who experience
tragic disappointments in their expectations of medicine attempt to assuage their grief, helplessness, and
despair by suing — that is, blaming — the physician.
In doing so, they often fail to discriminate among
errors of negligence, other errors, natural variations,
and acts of fate. Under the stress of life-and-death
decision making, physicians also readily experience
negative outcomes as blows to their sense of competence and professional pride. In the midst of such tragedy the physician is tempted to terminate the relationship, saying, "There is nothing more I can do." For
the patient, then, a malpractice suit becomes the
mechanism by which to force the "abandoning" physician to share both the responsibility for the outcome
and — less obviously — the experience of distress and
rage occasioned by suffering. [2]
Informed Consent: A Double-Edged Sword
At first sight, the informed-consent procedure seems
to offer a way of ameliorating these strains. Nonetheless, physicians by and large have not welcomed informed consent. Besides viewing it as "red tape" and
the imposition of a legal constraint on the exercise of
professional judgment, physicians have expressed misgivings about the clinical ramifications of informed
consent. [3,4]
In fact, the clinical impact of informed consent is
double-edged. [5,6] Despite its positive effects of clarify
ing options and stimulating mutual understanding,
the procedure is not without risk. It can bring to a
crisis latent problems that the patient may have in
accepting uncertainty — problems that can take two
strikingly opposite forms.
At one extreme, calling attention to risks (especially
in the chilling style of an informed-consent form) can
touch off feelings of helplessness by crystallizing the
patient's awareness that the situation really is uncertain. At the other extreme, the seemingly authoritative
list of complications with their numerical probabilities, which lay persons have been found to desire, [7]
can be used as a magical ritual to dispel the uncertainty. [8] Ironically, such an overly tidy disclosure can inflate the magical hope that "all bases have been covered," and disappointment may lead to malpractice
suits. The twin dangers, then, lie in exaggerating how
little or how much the physician knows.
Ideally, the clinical utility of informed consent lies
in bridging the gap between either of the two fantasies
— helpless ignorance or omnipotent certainty — and a
more complicated reality. To achieve this goal, however, physicians must stop thinking of informed consent as a formality (the recital of options and signing of
the form) and enter into it with their patients as a
process of mutual discovery. [9] Informed consent as we
envision it here is not an empty gesture toward liability reduction but an interaction between physician
and patient, a dialogue intended not only to satisfy
this legal requirement but to do more as well. The real
clinical opportunity offered by informed consent is
that of transforming uncertainty from a threat to the
doctor—patient alliance into the very basis on which an
alliance can be formed. 1 This is particularly important, since a sense of working together with the doctor
may be one of the major elements in avoiding negative
reactions to treatment. [10] An approach to this problem
is outlined below.
Practical Considerations
Understand the Origins of the Patient's Fantasies
of Certainty
Patients invoke wishful or magical thinking as a
defense against feelings of helplessness. The fears, doubts, and actual disablements
of illness reactivate
memories of childhood helplessness and, in turn, of the
grandiose and magical thoughts that are virtually the
child's only defense. When illness presents a threat to
one's well-being — to one's very being, in fact — one
attempts to resolve the discrepancy between the perception of powerlessness and the wish for omnipotence
by transferring the latter to the physician. The patient
says to the physician, in effect, "Okay, I am not perfect, but you will make me good as new. I cede to you
the magical powers of my infantile self" [11] The patient
thus forms with the physician what psychiatrists call
an "irrational" or "narcissistic" alliance, in which the
patient approaches the physician as child to parent
rather than as adult to adult. [12] In this context the
patient is simply not receptive to any disavowal of
certainty on the physician's part, hearing it instead as
an alienating rejection of the omnipotent, magical role
scripted for the physician.
Magical notions of science play a key part in such
fantasies of cure. The physician is a representative of
science, which is conceived of (certainly in the unconscious but consciously in some cases) as a source of
absolutely certain knowledge. [1] Unfortunately, the
trust in scientific omnipotence may easily degenerate
into paranoid distrust: the patient, already a helpless
victim of illness, now feels like the helpless victim of an
all-powerful science as well. If the patient is allowed to
remain in this dependent state, subsequent outcomes
of a disillusioning nature may lead to further regression and refusal to assume responsibility for self-monitoring and self-care or, regrettably, to litigation.
Empathize with the Patient's Unrealistic Wishes
The physician should resist what might seem the
logical move of dismantling the unrealistic foundation
of the narcissistic alliance by confronting it head-on;
one cannot expect to take away the wishful thinking
(and the resulting unhealthy attachment to the physician) without providing a different kind of comfort — and attempting a different kind of alliance — in its
place.
Paradoxically, the best way to effect this substitution is to empathize with the patient's wish for certainty and with its specific manifestations as understandable human reactions to a difficult and painful
situation. Explicit identification with the patient's fantasies is conveyed through such remarks as, "I wish I
could give you a medication that was sure to have only
positive effects" and "There is just no guarantee you'll
live through this — I wish there were," which invite
the patient to exchange idealization for identification.
The patient can now approach the physician not as a
childhood fantasy ideal but as another vulnerable human being facing — and hence, sharing — the same
uncertainty. The physician is linked with the realistic,
adult part of the patient in what is called a "rational"
alliance, with two adults collaborating to reach a
reasonable agreement based in reality. Instead of
squaring off defensively against each other, doctor and
patient are brought together by the shared acknowl-edgment of clinical uncertainty
and of the fantasies
used to deny it. [12]
Wean the Patient from the Fantasy of Certainty
Once the patient and physician are looking at the
fantasy together, the physician can guide the patient
in seeing it for what it is. Indeed, the very words used
to establish the identification and alliance between patient and physician can begin the work of separating
the patient from the fantasy. Expressions like "I wish
it were possible . . . ," even as they validate the wish
as a wish, imply tactfully that it is contrary to fact.
Clarifying statements (e.g., "Many people do believe
that one can specify in advance every possible complication of an operation") offer the patient tactful support in taking a critical look at beliefs that he or she
may share with "many people." [13]
Having provided this emotional and interpersonal
grounding, the physician can proceed to the explicit
disavowal of omnipotence and the substantive education of the patient about uncertainty. Both the implicit
and explicit teaching separate the reality of human
science from the fantasy of godlike science. Now the
patient is a participant-observer rather than, say, simply the object of the physician's "experiment." It must
be stressed, though, that this alliance and the awareness it generates rest on assurance of the physician's
continuing availability to share the uncertainty — expressed, for example, in statements such as, "I'll be
with you every step of the way." Implicit in this statement is the promise of a continuing relationship, even
if there is a tragic outcome. When this promise is fulfilled, the patient is less likely to feel a need to force the
physician to share the experience of the misfortune by
means of a malpractice suit.
Note that our approach stresses the selection of
what to say to patients rather than such advice as
taking more time with patients or telling them more.
In practice, less time is taken and more is understood:
sound efficiency of communication, not mere volume
of words, is the desideratum.
Conclusion
Informed consent need not be a mere formality with
a limited medicolegal function. Rather, it can be a
focal point in establishing a therapeutic alliance. Seen
as a dialogue in which both the cognitive and affective
implications of uncertainty are acknowledged and
shared, informed consent is a powerful clinical tool.
Through its use, helplessness is replaced by a degree of
control as the patient becomes a coexperimenter rather than a passive object of experimentation. Hopelessness is replaced by a degree of hope as the patient
comes to see that uncertainty does not imply irrationality, defeat, or abandonment. Finally, the alliance
between the patient and physician, instead of being
Undermined by the specious denial of uncertainty, is
strengthened by the mutuality of its acceptance.
The legal benefits flow from the clinical ones. The
Usual perfunctory approach to informed consent can
be characterized as a form of defensive medicine. Undertaken primarily to protect
the physician from legal
liability, it often fails to do even that. In contrast, the
therapeutic use of informed consent to enlist the patient in an active alliance with the physician discourages overly simplistic blaming and reduces the alienation from the physician that leads the patient to seek
legal remedies for dissatisfaction. This is true malpractice prevention, which offers the physician stronger legal protection by allowing both doctor and patient
to deepen their understanding while building a supportive and trusting relationship — a relationship
based not on unrealistic certainty but on honesty in
facing the uncertainty inherent in clinical practice.
Massachusetts Mental
Health Center
Boston, MA 02115
Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D.
Harold Bursztajn, M.D.
Archie Brodsky, B.A.
Supported in part by a grant (5T01-MH-16460-03) from the National Institute of Mental Health.
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