United States v. Doe
A Maine federal court held that a defendant could use expert testimony
to negate mens rea, and a "battered woman syndrome" theory
to support a duress defense. Also, the expert would not be required to
provide his notes to the government and she would not have to submit
to psychiatric testing from the government.
The federal government sought to exclude expert defense testimony on
defendant Doe's mental capacity and the role of battered
woman syndrome as a defense to possession and distribution of controlled
substances. The government argued that under the Insanity Defense Reform
Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. §17, evidence of mental disease is admissible only
to demonstrate elements of an insanity defense. In the alternative, the
government sought access to Doe's medical records and an order requiring
Doe to undergo a psychiatric exam.
The IDRA established a standard for the insanity defense while noting
that "[m]ental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense." Id., at §17(a). Doe contended that the
statute abolished affirmative defenses other than insanity, but permitted
defendants to introduce evidence negating mens rea. The court
agreed with Doe and all other circuits interpreting the statute.
See e.g., United States v. Cameron, 907 F2d 1051 (11th Cir.
1990), 15 MPDLR 485. The consensus reasoning was that presentation of
evidence to negate mens rea did not "constitute a defense" because
such a presentation merely negates one element of the alleged offense.
The court found that Doe could present expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome as a duress defense provided the evidence was relevant
and not unreasonably prejudicial. In addition, evidence of Doe's
vulnerability to coercion by her alleged batterer was relevant to whether
she acted as a reasonable person in response to any alleged coercion.
Moreover, the government did not have rights to access medical notes
from defendant's experts. The federal rules specifically limit adverse
party inspection to "results or reports." Fed. R. Crim.P. 16(b)(1)(B).
And, notes taken during a mental examination were merely raw data, not
results or reports as contemplated by the Rule.
Finally, the court found that the right to examine a criminal defendant
was limited to determining mental competency to stand trial or to rebut
an insanity defense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c). Because neither issue
was present in this case, the court denied the government's request.
Comment: Subsequent to the above ruling, Dr. Bursztajn
was retained by the United States as a forensic psychiatry expert. His
observation of trial testimony, including that of the defense experts,
resulted in his being able to testify on behalf of the government. His
testimony focussed on the minimum standards for forensic psychiatric
examination and diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the government.