State of IL v. Aubrey D. Tucker, Jr.
Case #05 CF 19
Lawrence County, Illinois
Defense Attorneys:
David M. Williams, Esq.
Fairfield, IL 62837
ph. 618 842 9171
e-mail: wmslaw@verizon.net
Matt Vaughn, Esq.
Fairfield, IL 62837
ph. 618 842 9266
e-mail: vaughnlaw@justice.com
Defense Expert:
Harold J. Bursztajn, M.D.
Associate Clinical Professor
Co-founder, Program in Psychiatry and the Law
Department of Psychiatry
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Harvard Medical School
96 Larchwood Drive
Cambridge, MA 02138
ph. 617-492-8366
e-mail: hbursztajn@hms.harvard.edu
Summary:
Defendant Tucker was charged with first-degree murder in the shotgun
slaying of 34-month-old Gertrude Bilskie Crump of Lawrenceville,
Illinois on February 8, 2005. He also wounded the girl’s aunt, Trinka
Crump, and her grandparents, Rebecca and Michael Allen. Tucker faced
the death penalty if convicted. In Illinois a jury must agree unanimously
to a death sentence; otherwise, a sentence of life-imprisonment is
imposed.
Forensic psychiatrist Harold J. Bursztajn of Harvard Medical School testified
in three phases of the legal proceedings. The first phase was a
suppression hearing in which the defense alleged that Tucker’s confession
the day after the shootings had been involuntary and coerced. The
confession was found to be admissible. However, Dr. Bursztajn was
allowed to testify subsequently at the sentencing mitigation hearing
regarding the unreliability of the confession.
Second, as part of the guilt/innocence phase of the proceedings, Dr.
Bursztajn made an offer of proof that had the indicated
neurophysiological testing been performed to rule out the possibility
of a seizure disorder, Dr. Bursztajn could have testified regarding
the defendant’s capacity to form specific intent. He might also have
been able to offer evidence related to other forms of diminished
capacity in support of a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI).
Finally, after the defendant was convicted in the guilt phase of the
trial, Dr. Bursztajn testified in the sentencing phase that, based
on available data, three out of five potential mitigating factors
were present. These included chronic alcoholism and malnutrition
with consequent brain damage, repeated head trauma as a child in
the context of ongoing abuse at the hands of Tucker’s father, and
lingering neuropsychiatric effects consequent to a serious childhood
neurological illness. Tragically, in spite of an evident neuropsychiatric
disorder at the time of Tucker’s imprisonment for manslaughter in
the killing of his father in Kentucky in 1993, Tucker apparently
had received no mental health treatment while incarcerated. Within
a month of his discharge in 2002 he began drinking 30 beers a day
with little food intake while sleeping only one to two hours per
night.
In the mitigation phase Dr. Bursztajn also had an opportunity to comment
on the police interrogation techniques employed after Tucker’s arrest
in 2005, which included repeated physical contact with an obviously
disoriented and partially deaf defendant. These police interrogation
techniques, Dr. Bursztajn testified, created a coercive atmosphere
in which the defendant was willing to accept suggestions from the
police as a means of terminating, as quickly as possible, a physically
and emotionally tortuous interrogation.
At the mitigation hearing the jury found that sufficient mitigating factors
were present to preclude a death-penalty verdict.
There are at least two potential grounds for appeal of the guilty verdict.
The first is the admission of the allegedly coerced and potentially
prejudicial confession. The second is the failure to permit critical
neurophysiological testing of the defendant to allow for assistance
to counsel at trial with respect to a diminished-capacity
defense.