COOMBES
v.
FLORIO
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SJC-09869
LYN-ANN COOMBES, administratrix, [1] vs. ROLAND J. FLORIO.
Norfolk. May 8, 2007. - December 10, 2007.
Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, & Cordy,
JJ.
Negligence, Doctor, Duty to warn, Foreseeability of harm, Causation.
Doctor, Doctor-patient relationship.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 17, 2002.
The case was heard by Elizabeth B. Donovan, J., on a motion for summary
judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case
from the Appeals Court.
William P. Rose (Peter L. Eleey with him) for the plaintiff.
Edward F. Mahoney for the defendant.
Carl Valvo & John R. Hitt, for Professional Liability Foundation,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Marsha V. Kazarosian, J. Michael Conley, & Joseph C. Borsellino,
for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted
a brief.
BY THE COURT. The judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the
Superior Court for further proceedings.
So ordered.
Separate opinions of Justice Ireland, with whom Justice Spina and Justice
Cowin join; Justice Greaney; Chief Justice Marshall; and Justice Cordy.
IRELAND, J. (concurring, with whom Spina and Cowin, JJ., join). In this
case we consider whether a physician owes a duty of care to someone other
than his patient for harm caused by his failure to warn the patient of
the effects of his treatment of that patient. The decedent, Kevin Coombes
(Coombes), died of injuries he sustained when he was struck by an automobile
driven by David Sacca. At the time of the accident Sacca was under the
care of his physician, the defendant, Roland Florio. The plaintiff claims
that the accident was caused when the side effects of the medication
Dr. Florio prescribed caused Sacca to lose control of the automobile.
The plaintiff sued Dr. Florio for negligence. [2] A
judge in the Superior Court granted Dr. Florio's motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that Dr. Florio owed no duty of care to anyone other than
his own patient. The plaintiff appealed and we transferred the case on
our own motion. Because I believe that Dr. Florio owes a duty of care
to all those foreseeably put at risk by his failure to warn about the
effects of the treatment he provides to his patients, I agree that this
court should reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
1. Background. I recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, reserving details for later discussion. Dr. Florio became
Sacca's primary care physician in 1999. By 2002, when the accident occurred,
Sacca was seventy-five years old and had been diagnosed with a number
of serious medical conditions including asbestosis, chronic bronchitis,
emphysema, high blood pressure, and metastatic lung cancer that had spread
to his lymph nodes. As the primary care physician, Dr. Florio coordinated
the multiple specialists who were involved in Sacca's care, and was responsible
for all of the prescription medication that Sacca used. By the time of
the accident Sacca was visiting Dr. Florio six or seven times each year.
Shortly after the cancer was diagnosed, in July, 2000, Dr. Florio warned
Sacca that it would not be safe for him to drive during his treatment
for cancer. Sacca obeyed the warning and did not drive until the fall
of 2001, when treatment for his cancer concluded. At that time Dr. Florio
advised Sacca that he could safely resume driving.
At the time of the accident Sacca had prescriptions from Dr. Florio for
Oxycodone, Zaroxolyn, Prednisone, Flomax, Potassium, Paxil, Oxazepam,
and Furosemide. Potential side effects of the drugs include drowsiness,
dizziness, lightheadedness, fainting, altered consciousness, and sedation. [3] According
to the plaintiff's expert, when used in combination these drugs have
the potential to cause "additive side effects" that could be
more severe than side effects resulting from separate use. The plaintiff's
expert also opined that the sedating effects of these drugs can be more
severe in older patients, and that the standard of care for a primary
care physician includes warning elderly or chronically ill patients about
the potential side effects of these drugs, and their effect on a patient's
ability to drive. Dr. Florio did not warn Sacca of any potential side
effects. Before the accident occurred Sacca reported no side effects
from the medication and had no trouble driving. Sacca's last visit to
Dr. Florio before the accident was on January 4, 2002. At that visit,
Dr. Florio did not discuss potential side effects and gave no warning
about driving.
On the day of the accident, March 22, 2002, Sacca drove his automobile
to do some errands. On his way home he lost consciousness and his automobile
left the road and hit Coombes, who was standing on the sidewalk with
a friend. Sacca regained consciousness shortly after the accident and
was taken to a nearby hospital. He left the hospital against medical
advice and the cause of the incident was never determined. The plaintiff's
expert opined that the accident was probably caused by a combination
of Sacca's medical conditions and the medication he was taking.
The plaintiff sued Dr. Florio for negligently prescribing medication
without warning Sacca of the dangers posed by its side effects, and without
warning Sacca not to drive. The case proceeded to the Superior Court,
where a judge granted summary judgment for the doctor, ruling that there
was no special relationship between Dr. Florio and Coombes, and that
Dr. Florio owed Coombes no duty. [4]
2. Discussion. "The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment
is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, all material facts have been established and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 56
(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). An order granting summary judgment will be
upheld only if it relies on undisputed material facts and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Community Nat'l Bank
v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 556 (1976).
I begin by clarifying the nature of the plaintiff's claim. It is not
a malpractice claim because it lacks a physician-patient relationship
between plaintiff and defendant, an essential element of any malpractice
claim. See St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 418 Mass. 511, 520 (1994). Instead,
the plaintiff presents an ordinary negligence claim. As framed by the
plaintiff's complaint, it is limited to Dr. Florio's failure to warn
of the known potential side effects of the medications he prescribed. [5]
The plaintiff presents three different arguments supporting her claim
that Dr. Florio committed a breach of a duty owed not only to Sacca,
but also to Coombes. First, she argues that under ordinary common-law
negligence principles Dr. Florio was negligent in prescribing medication
without warning Sacca of their potential side effects, and that Dr. Florio's
duty in this regard extended to Coombes because his injury was a foreseeable
consequence of that negligence. Second, she argues that once Dr. Florio
assured Sacca that it would be safe to drive he assumed a duty to warn
Sacca of the dangers of driving while using the medications he later
prescribed, and that this duty was owed to all those put at risk by affirming
Sacca's ability to drive. Third, relying on this court's interpretation
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965), she argues that the
special relationship between doctor and patient creates a duty of reasonable
care that extends not only to a patient but to others put at risk by
the medical care provided. The plaintiff's special relationship and assumed
duty theories are inapplicable in this case. [6] However,
I agree that Dr. Florio owed a duty to Coombes under ordinary negligence
principles.
"To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must show 'the existence
of an act or omission in violation of a . . . duty owed to the plaintiff[s]
by the defendant." Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 320 (2002),
quoting Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 804 (1982). Whether a defendant
owes a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care is a question of law that
is decided "by reference to existing social values and customs and
appropriate social policy." Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 292
(1993). "We have recognized that '[a]s a general principle of tort
law, every actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid physical
harm to others.' See Remy v. MacDonald, [440 Mass. 675,] 677 [(2004)]
. . . . A precondition to this duty is, of course, that the risk of harm
to another be recognizable or foreseeable to the actor. . . . Consequently,
with some important exceptions, 'a defendant owes a duty of care to all
persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to
all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.' Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., [17 Cal. 3d 425,] 434-435 [(1976)]." (Citations
omitted.) Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 147 (2006). Although a jury are
uniquely qualified to determine the scope of the duty at issue, see Commonwealth
v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 446 Mass. 128, 137-138 (2006), "[t]he existence
of a legal duty is a question of law appropriate for resolution by summary
judgment." Afarian v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 449 Mass. 257, 261
(2007). "If no such duty exists, a claim of negligence cannot be
brought." Remy v. MacDonald, supra.
In the context of medical professionals, this court has held that a doctor's
duty of reasonable care, owed to a patient, includes the duty to provide
appropriate warnings about side effects when prescribing drugs. Cottam
v. CVS Pharmacy, supra at 321. As a result, "[p]hysicians . . .
are required to inform their patients of those side effects they determine
are necessary and relevant for patients to know in making an informed
decision." Id. When the side effects in question include drowsiness,
dizziness, fainting, or other effects that could diminish a patient's
mental capacity, this warning serves to protect the patient from, for
example, the foreseeable risk of an automobile accident caused by driving
while under the influence of the medication. In the case of automobile
accidents, it is clear that the foreseeable risk of injury is not limited
to the patient.
In similar cases outside the medical context, when the foreseeable risk
in question is the risk of an impaired driver causing an automobile accident,
we have extended a duty of reasonable care to all those involved in such
a foreseeable accident, including other motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians.
See Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 7-8, 10-12
(1983) (liquor store liable for injuries to cyclist struck by automobile
driven by minor to whom liquor store had sold beer); Jesionek v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 376 Mass. 101, 106 (1978) (jury could have found owner of
forklift liable to pedestrian injured when drunken seaman drove forklift
over her foot; foreseeable consequence of negligently leaving key in
ignition); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501 (1968) (negligence
of bar extended to motorist killed in collision with automobile driven
by man who became intoxicated at bar). This is so even when the plaintiff
is unknown to the defendant before the accident. See Jupin v. Kask, supra
at 149 n.8 (foreseeability of danger to specific person irrelevant; sufficient
that general kind of harm was foreseeable); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc.,
supra at 500-501 (foreseeable consequence of selling liquor to intoxicated
patron was that accident would injure third party, even when identity
of third party was unforeseeable).
Our cases have also held that a duty can exist even when the unreasonably
dangerous condition involves the foreseeable criminal or negligent conduct
of an intermediary. See Jupin v. Kask, supra at 149; Onofrio v. Department
of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 610 (1990), S.C. 411 Mass. 657 (1992);
Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., supra at 11-12; Mullins v.
Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 51-52 (1983). See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 302A & 302B (1965). In Jupin v. Kask, supra
at 143, a homeowner failed to store properly a gun kept in her home.
A police officer was later shot and killed by the gun owner's son, who
had taken the weapon from the improperly locked cabinet. Id. at 145.
We concluded that it was foreseeable that the gun owner's adult son,
who had a history of violence, who had problems with the law, and who
was under psychiatric observation, would use the unsecured weapon in
the commission of a violent crime. Id. at 149. The homeowner's duty to
properly store the gun was owed not only to members of the household,
but also to victims harmed as a result of the unauthorized use of the
gun. Id. at 149 n.8, 160. Whether the owner actually did or should have
foreseen the particular plaintiff and the particular circumstances of
the harm that eventually occurred was irrelevant. Id. at 149 n.8. The
homeowner owed a duty to the police officer who was shot because the
harm the officer suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the homeowner's
risk-creating conduct. Id. That the harm was also the result of the criminal
actions of the son did not foreclose the homeowner's responsibility because
the possibility of his criminal conduct was foreseeable, and his criminal
actions were enabled by the owner's own negligent storage of the gun.
Id. at 148-150.
We reached a similar conclusion in Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor,
Inc., supra at 12, in which a liquor store negligently sold beer to a
minor. Hours later, after drinking some of the beer, the minor drove
his car while intoxicated and caused an accident, killing a bicyclist.
Id. at 8. In considering whether the harm to the bicyclist was the foreseeable
result of the sale of the beer, we concluded that in the case of alcoholic
beverages served to minors, "[o]ne of the more foreseeable risks
is that the minor may drive and cause harm to third persons while intoxicated." Id.
at 12. The criminal or negligent conduct of the intervening actor, here
the minor who purchased the alcohol and then drove while intoxicated,
did not foreclose the store's duty to the bicyclist. Id. The actions
of the minor purchaser and the injury suffered by the bicyclist were
a foreseeable consequence of the store's negligent sale. Id.
Relying on those same principles, I conclude that a physician owes a
duty of reasonable care to everyone foreseeably put at risk by his failure
to warn of the side effects of his treatment of a patient. See McKenzie
v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 98 Haw. 296, 307-309 (2002);
Joy v. Eastern Me. Med. Ctr., 529 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1987); Hardee
v. Bio-Med. Applications of S.C., Inc., 370 S.C. 511, 516 (2006); Burroughs
v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tenn. 2003); Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm § 41 comment h at 807 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005). But see Gilhuly v. Dockery, 273 Ga. App. 418 (2005); Kirk
v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 117 Ill. 2d 507, 531-532 (1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Calwell v. Hassan, 260 Kan. 769, 783-784
(1996).
Courts in other jurisdictions have imposed a duty on doctors in circumstances
similar to this case. In McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
supra at 307-309, the court held that a doctor owed a duty to a person
killed in an automobile accident caused by the doctor's patient who was
driving after taking medication prescribed for him by the doctor. The
court reasoned that "a logical reason exists to impose upon physicians,
for the benefit of third parties, a duty to advise their patients that
a medication may affect the patient's driving ability when such a duty
would otherwise be owed to the patient." Id. at 308. In Joy v. Eastern
Me. Med. Ctr., supra at 1366, the court held that a doctor owed a duty
to a person killed in an automobile accident that was caused by his patient,
who was driving while wearing an eye patch that had been given to him
as part of the treatment for an eye abrasion. The court concluded that "the
general requirement [is] that when a doctor knows, or reasonably should
know that his patient's ability to drive has been affected, he has a
duty to the driving public as well as to the patient to warn his patient
of that fact." Id.
I recognize that some courts have limited a doctor's duty to third parties
to warn of the effects of drugs or treatments that were administered
by the doctor, while declining to extend liability where the drugs were
prescribed by the doctor but used outside of his presence. See, e.g.,
Cheeks v. Dorsey, 846 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lester
v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404, 406-407 (1998). I decline to make such a distinction.
When a doctor prescribes medication it is both a foreseeable and intended
result that a patient will take the medication. The occurrence of known
side effects, and the impact of such side effects on the patient's ability
to drive, are foreseeable results of that prescription. Furthermore,
the inability of a doctor to control the conditions under which his patient
takes prescribed drugs is not determinative where, as here, the plaintiff
contends only that the doctor owed a duty to warn. See Cottam v. CVS
Pharmacy, supra at 321.
Sound public policy also favors a duty in these circumstances. The costs
of imposing a duty owed to individuals other than a patient are limited
because existing tort law already imposes on a doctor a duty to warn
a patient of the adverse side effects of medications. See Cottam v. CVS
Pharmacy, supra, citing McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 113 Wash.
2d 701, 709 (1989). The duty described here does not impose a heavy burden
because it requires nothing from a doctor that is not already required
by his duty to his patient. See McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group,
Inc., supra at 306; Hardee v. Bio-Med. Applications of S.C., Inc., supra;
Burroughs v. Magee, supra at 333. Meanwhile, the benefits of such warnings
are significant. They serve to protect the public from the very harm
that creates the parallel duty to the patient, the foreseeable risk that
known side effects of a drug will impair a patient's ability to drive.
See McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., supra at 307; Burroughs
v. Magee, supra at 332-333.
Dr. Florio argues that the increased number of potential plaintiffs created
by this rule could create a fear of litigation that would intrude into
a doctor's very decision of what medication to prescribe or what treatment
to pursue. Any such harmful consequence would be limited because the
duty I describe is limited to warning of the effects of treatment. This
duty is narrower than a doctor's duty to use due care when deciding to
prescribe a particular drug or pursue a particular course of treatment.
I need not address whether a nonpatient could base a negligence claim
on a doctor's negligent prescribing decision, although I recognize that
protecting the doctor-patient relationship may provide a sound policy
reason for limiting such a duty to the patient. See McKenzie v. Hawai'i
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., supra at 303; Burroughs v. Magee, supra
at 333.
Dr. Florio also argues that widespread concern with medical malpractice
rates justifies imposing a "no duty" rule in this case, and
for support he cites a number of statutes enacted by the Legislature
that attempt to limit the liability of doctors. Allowing a larger number
of potential plaintiffs may result in some increase in litigation, and
that may in turn result in an increase in medical malpractice rates.
However, I would leave to the Legislature the task of determining whether
to impose further limits on doctors' liability.
Turning now to the facts of this case, and considering those facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is left to determine whether
it was foreseeable that Dr. Florio's failure to warn of the side effects
of Sacca's medications could cause an automobile accident. I conclude
that it was, and that Dr. Florio owed a duty to all those foreseeably
put at risk by his failure to warn, including Coombes. The medications
Dr. Florio prescribed had known potential side effects including dizziness,
drowsiness, and altered consciousness, symptoms that were likely to impair
a motorist. See McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., supra
at 307 ("it is evident that a patient who is unaware of the risk
of driving while under the influence of a particular prescription medication
will probably do so"); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash.
2d 461, 465 (1965) (bus accident allegedly caused when driver suffered
side effect of drowsiness was "in the general field of danger, which
should reasonably have been foreseen by the doctor when he administered
the drug"). The combination of drugs had the potential to result
in "additive side effects" that further increased the likelihood
that Sacca's ability to drive would become impaired. Sacca's age also
increased the likelihood and potential severity of any side effects.
Dr. Florio had also previously advised Sacca that he could safely resume
driving, thereby making it all the more foreseeable that an accident
would occur. Any duty that Dr. Florio owed to warn of the side effects
of medication he prescribed extended not only to Sacca, but to those
whose injuries were foreseeably caused by the resulting accident. This
does not imply Dr. Florio owed a duty to Coombes to warn of every side
effect of every drug he prescribed. Rather, considering these facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, including the number and nature
of the drugs prescribed, the age and health of the patient, and the earlier
assurance about the ability of the patient to drive, it was foreseeable
that Sacca would suffer side effects that would impair his driving, and
that an accident would result. Therefore, Dr. Florio's duty to warn extended
to Coombes. Ultimately, of course, whether Dr. Florio committed a breach
of that duty when prescribing these drugs to Sacca without a warning
is a factual determination left to a jury. [7]
As support for his contention that the accident was not foreseeable,
Dr. Florio points to the length of time that passed between when the
drugs were first prescribed and when the accident occurred with no report
of side effects, and the absence of any evidence that Sacca experienced
difficulty driving before the accident occurred. However, the breach
of duty alleged by the plaintiff occurred when Dr. Florio first prescribed
the drugs without warning of their potential effects. The subsequent
passage of time without incident could not retrospectively lessen a doctor's
duty, a breach of which had already taken place, to warn of potential
side effects.
Dr. Florio cites our past reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 315 (1965) to argue that he has no duty to control the actions of an
intermediary such as Sacca in the absence of a special relationship between
himself and Coombes. He argues that because he had no ability to control
Sacca's actions, and because a doctor-patient relationship is not a special
relationship for purposes of § 315, he could have owed no duty to Coombes.
He misunderstands the role of special relationships in establishing a
duty. Section 315 is an exception to the general rule, stated in § 314,
that a person has no duty to act affirmatively to protect another from
harm. It describes one circumstance where an affirmative duty to control
the actions of an intermediary may be imposed: "There is no duty
so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless . . . a special relationship exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to
control the third person's conduct . . . ." We have invoked this
rule when determining whether an affirmative duty existed. See, e.g.,
Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 440 Mass. 195, 202-203 (2003) (neither
basketball coach nor university owed duty to player of opposing team
because there was no special relationship between them); Jean W. v. Commonwealth,
414 Mass. 496, 513-514 (1993) (Liacos, C.J., concurring) (special relationship
between parole officer and parolee could impose duty on officer to control
conduct of parolee). However, there is no need to resort to imposing
an affirmative duty to conclude that Dr. Florio owed a duty to Coombes.
It was Dr. Florio's own act of prescribing medication that created the
foreseeable risk of an accident, and his duty to warn flows from that
act and extends to all those foreseeably put at risk by it. [8] See
McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., supra at 299-300 (special
relationship arguments inapplicable where defendant's own act created
foreseeable risk). Even allowing an affirmative duty in this case, § 315
would have limited relevance because it provides only that a person has
no duty to control the conduct of another in the absence of a special
relationship, whereas the duty claimed by the plaintiff is merely a duty
to warn. Dr. Florio's contention that he had no ability to control Sacca's
actions would therefore present no barrier to imposing even an affirmative
duty to warn.
Finally, Dr. Florio argues that there is insufficient evidence in the
record to support the plaintiff's contention that the accident was caused
by the side effects of Sacca's medication. "A court must deny a
motion for summary judgment if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there exist genuine issues of material
fact . . . ." Golub v. Milpo, Inc., 402 Mass. 397, 400 (1988), citing
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The plaintiff has presented evidence that the
known side effects of Sacca's medication included drowsiness, lightheadedness,
and altered consciousness. Her expert states that the medication was
probably one factor contributing to the accident. Although Dr. Florio
points to the absence of any conclusive evidence that the side effects
of the medication were the cause of the accident, the plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
the cause of the accident. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.
3. Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, I concur in the decision
to reverse the grant of summary judgment for Dr. Florio.
GREANEY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). The undisputed
facts of this case are tragic. David E. Sacca, a seventy-five year old,
gravely ill man, suffered from, among other ailments, asbestosis, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, high blood pressure, and metastatic lung
cancer. He had never before caused a motor vehicle accident (nor been
issued a traffic citation) until March 22, 2002, when he lost control
of his motor vehicle and struck and killed Kevin Coombes, a ten year
old boy. Sacca's physical and emotional health quickly declined, and
he died four months after the accident. The plaintiff asserts that Sacca
had taken several prescription medicines that rendered him unable to
drive safely and ultimately caused him to lose consciousness while driving
on March 22, and further, that Sacca's physician, Dr. Roland J. Florio,
failed to warn Sacca of the hazards of driving while taking the prescribed
medications. Had Dr. Florio properly cautioned Sacca, the plaintiff argues,
the accident would not have occurred. In my view, when a physician who
has knowledge of a danger that may be posed to others from a patient's
decision to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of prescribed
medication (a danger of which the public has no way of knowing) does
not warn the patient of the risks involved, the physician may be held
liable for injuries to others caused by the failure to warn. The imposition
of limited liability in such a case, where the circumstances warrant,
may prevent tragedies similar to this one in the future.
I cannot agree, however, with the proposition that liability in such
a case is justified by principles of ordinary negligence. This concept
is incorrect and leads Justice Ireland (and those Justices joining his
opinion) to the sweeping conclusion that physicians owe a legal duty
of care to virtually everyone who may come in contact with one of his
or her patients. This conclusion is unwarranted and goes far beyond what
is necessary to resolve this case. The plaintiff, in her complaint, seeks
damages for Dr. Florio's alleged negligent failure to warn Sacca "that
his various medications would affect him in a manner so as to make it
dangerous for him to operate a motor vehicle and to advise him not to
operate a motor vehicle while taking these medications." For this
court to grant more than the requested relief, by creating a precautionary
duty previously unknown in common law, would be extraordinary. Accordingly,
although I concur in the court's determination that summary judgment
for Dr. Florio should not have been granted, I dissent from the pronouncement,
in Justice Ireland's opinion, that a physician owes a duty of care to
everyone foreseeably put at risk by his failure to warn a patient of
the effects of his treatment of that patient. My reasons are as follows.
Physicians' decisions concerning patient care are matters of professional
judgment and, with the exception of malpractice claims (which this is
not), fall beyond the scope of judicial fact finding. To equate a physician's
prescribing of medication to "unreasonably dangerous" conduct,
ante at (Ireland, J., concurring), similar to serving alcohol to minors
or already inebriated persons or to the reckless storage of firearms,
which creates a general affirmative duty of care to others, is an immoderate
and indefensible characterization of the medical profession, and one
that, as Chief Justice Marshall (post at [Marshall, C.J., dissenting])
and Justice Cordy (post at & n.1 [Cordy, J., dissenting]) point out,
impermissibly intrudes on the traditional physician-patient relationship
held virtually inviolate since the time of Hippocrates. A physician should
not, in ordinary circumstances, be held legally responsible for the safety
of others on the highway, or elsewhere, based on medical treatment afforded
a patient. To a physician, it is the patient (and not a third party with
whom the physician has no direct contact) who must always come first.
I also am skeptical of the court's assumption that "existing social
values, customs, and considerations of policy" dictate the imposition
of an unlimited affirmative duty of care in this case. Luoni v. Berube,
431 Mass. 729, 730 (2000).
It must be recognized, however, that, beyond the traditional, there exists
a separate legal relationship between a physician and his or her patient.
Based on that relationship, a physician is required to warn the patient
of known potentially dangerous side effects of prescribed medication,
including the possibility of experiencing drowsiness or loss of consciousness
while under the medication's influence. See Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436
Mass. 316, 321-322 (2002). [9] In the usual case, so
long as a physician provides his patient with an appropriate warning
(cautioning the patient about the possible danger of driving), the applicable
standard of care has been met, and a physician has no further duty. This
is so because many medications may affect a patient's ability to drive
safely, and the physician's legal duty is to give appropriate warnings
to a patient, in a manner consistent with the warnings advised by the
medication's manufacturer [10] and the physician's
personal knowledge of the patient's over-all health condition, including
the effects of additional medications being taken by the patient.
Extending the scope of liability for the benefit of third parties foreseeably
put at risk by an uninformed patient's decision to drive alters neither
the physician's medical decision to prescribe medication, nor the physician's
legal duty under the Cottam decision to warn the patient about adverse
side effects. Because the foreseeable risk of danger that the patient
faces (here, death or bodily injury due to a motor vehicle accident)
is the identical risk that the physician may anticipate others, such
as the plaintiff's son, to encounter, there can arise no conflict of
professional interest. Contrast Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 553-554
(1994) (lawyer's primary duty owed to client bars imposition of secondary
duty owed to third parties). The imposition of liability for a failure
to warn a patient rests on a physician's superior knowledge of the risks
(to the patient and to others) involved, and the physician's professional
responsibility to ensure that a patient understands the risks involved
in taking prescribed medications.
A physician's advice may not be followed, of course, and a physician
has no ability physically to prevent a patient from driving (or engaging
in any behavior that may be risky to himself or others). It cannot be
said, therefore, that a physician has a duty to control a patient's behavior
once that patient departs from the physician's office. Contrast Irwin
v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756 (1984), citing W. Prosser, Torts § 56 (4th
ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (a) (1965) (duty to control
conduct of third person to prevent physical harm to another when "special
relation exists between the actor and the third person"). There
is, however, a recognized measure of authority within the physician-patient
relationship, which permits, and even requires, a physician to take steps
to influence (or attempt to influence) a patient's conduct on matters
within the scope of that relationship. By informing (or otherwise counselling
or advising) a patient of known potential side effects of prescribed
medications that might affect the patient's ability to drive a motor
vehicle safely, and where appropriate, warning the patient not to drive
at all, a physician may effectively avoid any risk of danger to the patient
and to others. See McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 98
Haw. 296, 308 & n.13 (2002) [11]; Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 41 (a) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) ("actor in a special relationship with another
owes a duty of reasonable care to third persons with regard to risks
posed by the other that arise within the scope of the relationship");
id. at comment h ("physician's duty to the patient is explicitly
relational [and i]n some cases, care provided to a patient may create
risks to others"). [12]
In sum, a physician's duty to warn a patient arises entirely within the
context of the physician-patient relationship. Further, this duty is
owed strictly to the patient, in the sense that a physician has no duty
to warn others of the dangerous propensities of a patient who drives
while on medication known to cause drowsiness or blackouts (either unaware
of the danger or despite being aware of the danger). The violation of
that duty, however, in the limited circumstances described, may give
rise to liability in negligence to others who are foreseeably injured
as a direct result of the violation. [13]
Here, under the summary judgment standard, the plaintiff's facts, if
accepted, would permit a jury to find that because Dr. Florio should
have been aware of the side effects of the medications being taken by
Sacca, and was aware of Sacca's dire medical condition, he should have
warned Sacca not to drive a motor vehicle at all. The plaintiff must
still, of course, demonstrate to a jury that Dr. Florio violated his
duty to warn Sacca not to drive while taking the medications and, further,
that the violation was the cause of the fatal accident. If the elements
of negligence are successfully proved, however, the plaintiff should
be allowed to recover damages from Dr. Florio.
Decisions such as this one are necessarily based on the factual situation
before the court. Negligence law is not suitable to sweeping pronouncements,
and as experience indicates, a revised or expanded tort principle is
better left to case-by-case development. I would not preclude other actions
to apply the principle, but would leave the contours of the duty to warn
to be drawn in future fact-based inquiries.
MARSHALL, C.J. (dissenting). The events giving rise to the claims in
this case are indeed tragic. See ante at (Greaney, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But I respectfully disagree with the opinion
of Justice Ireland (and the two Justices who join him) that would establish
for the first time in this Commonwealth a physician's duty to prevent
harm to nonpatients, and would do so in sweeping terms. See ante at (Ireland,
J., concurring) (physician "owes a duty of care to all those foreseeably
put at risk by his failure to warn about the effects of the treatment
he provides to his patients"). I also cannot agree with Justice
Greaney's more cabined opinion that "a physician who has knowledge
of a danger that may be posed to others from a patient's decision to
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of prescribed medication
. . . may be held liable for injuries to others caused by the failure
to warn" the patient of the risks involved. Ante at (Greaney, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, the Superior
Court judge properly granted summary judgment to Dr. Florio on the ground
that he owed no duty to the decedent.
Justice Ireland would hold that "a physician owes a duty of reasonable
care to everyone foreseeably put at risk by his failure to warn of the
side effects of his treatment of a patient." Ante at (Ireland, J.,
concurring). The opinion is grounded on two false premises. First, as
Justice Cordy describes, Justice Ireland conflates the "duty to
warn" with the much more comprehensive "duty of care," and
thus vastly enlarges the field of physician liability. See post at (Cordy
J., dissenting). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical Harm § 41 comment h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (duty
to warn is "more limited" than duty to use reasonable care).
Second, Justice Ireland asserts that the physician liability to third
parties he would impose falls readily within the penumbra of our decision
in Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass 316 (2002) (Cottam), where, according
to Justice Ireland, "existing tort law already imposes on a doctor
a duty to warn a patient of the adverse side effects of medications." Ante
at (Ireland, J., concurring). Our existing tort law does not impose such
a duty, and Cottam does not bear the weight Justice Ireland assigns it.
At issue in Cottam, among other things, was the interplay between, on
the one hand, a patient's need for information sufficient to give informed
consent to prescribed medications and, on the other, a physician's need
for autonomy within the physician-patient relationship to act based on
the physician's reasoned professional judgment and his "knowledge
of the patient's medical history and unique condition." Id. at 321.
On this point we were careful to note that the physicians' duty is "to
inform themselves about the drug and warn their patients as they deem
necessary." Id. Lest there be any doubt of the scope of the duty,
we further stated that physicians, after considering the history and
needs of their patients and the quality of the drugs, are required "to
inform their patients of those side effects they determine are necessary
and relevant for patients to know in making an informed decision" (emphasis
added). Id. Our statement of a doctor's duty to his patient was precisely
calibrated to protect patients from harm while avoiding judicial interference
with the doctor-patient relationship.
By seeking to impose on doctors a duty to third parties that would require
a physician to inform a patient of any and all side effects of any and
all treatments of a patient, Justice Ireland does not limit his opinion
to warnings of the potential side effects of prescription medications. [14] See
ante at , (Ireland, J., concurring). Rather, his opinion stretches the
narrow holding in Cottam beyond recognition. In doing so, he significantly
shrinks the essential and protected space within which doctor and patient
can freely move together. Gone would be the physician's ability to exercise
independent professional judgment about how to present treatment options
to the patient. Gone would be the option to omit discussion of remotely
possible adverse side effects. The physician's concern for a patient's
ability to assess information about needed and appropriate treatment
would be forced to compete with concern for an amorphous, but widespread,
group of third parties whom a jury might one day determine to be "foreseeable" plaintiffs.
The physician would be forever looking over his shoulder. Nothing in
Cottam, a case of informed consent, portends the effort to impose such
blanket expansion of doctors' liability to third parties. [15]
Justice Greaney's more restrained analysis of the scope of a doctor's
liability to nonpatients [16] also is not supported
by the conclusion or rationale of Cottam. To hold, as Justice Greaney
would, that a physician is obligated by a duty to third parties to warn
a patient against driving when "a physician . . . has knowledge
of a danger that may be posed to others from a patient's decision to
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of prescribed medication," ante
at (Greaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), is effectively
to dictate that a physician forbid a patient from engaging in any "hazardous
activities" including operating a motor vehicle or heavy machinery,
ante at n.2 (Greaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
while taking the prescribed medication, regardless of whether, in the
physician's professional opinion, such a warning is necessary or wise
in the individual patient's circumstances. [17] Cf.
Cottam, supra at 321 (discussing physician's duty "to inform their
patients of those side effects they determine are necessary and relevant
for patients to know in making an informed decision").
For the reasons detailed by Justice Cordy in his dissent, I also reject
Justice Greaney's premise that the physician's purported duty to a nonpatient
radiates from the "special relationship" of physician to patient.
See post at n.3, (Cordy, J., dissenting). See also ante at (Greaney,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, McKenzie v. Hawai'i
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 98 Haw. 296 (2002), relied on by Justice
Greaney, see ante at (Greaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), expressly disavows the "special relationship" analysis
as "inapplicable" in a case with strikingly similar facts.
Id. at 300. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
Harm § 41 comment h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("The physician-patient
relationship is not among the relationships listed in this Section as
creating an affirmative duty").
Finally, I fail to see how the unwarranted extension of judicial power
suggested by the concurring opinions is cured by Justice Ireland's invitation
to the Legislature to fix the result reached today. Ante at (Ireland,
J., concurring) ("I would leave to the Legislature the task of determining
whether to impose further limits on doctors' liability"). The invitation
reverses the appropriate roles of the legislative and judicial branches.
It is for the court to proceed incrementally with the expansion of common-law
tort principles, and for the Legislature to initiate, if it chooses,
the policy process of comprehensive tort reform. One need not be clairvoyant
to understand the inevitable result of today's enlargement of liability:
a significant increase in third-party litigation against doctors and
an attendant increase in expenses at a time when our health care system
is already overwhelmed with collateral costs. The contrasting opinions
issued today suggest just how widely and thoroughly reasonable minds
may differ on this matter of broad social import.
Today's result impedes not only the work of doctors. It impedes the work
of our courts. On remand, the trial judge is left the unenviable task
of divining from the vague generalizations of the concurring opinions
the outer limits of a novel duty of physicians to third-party nonpatients.
Because I agree with the trial judge that the physician's liability does
not extend to the third-party decedent in this case, I would uphold the
grant of summary judgment in Dr. Florio's favor, and not leave it to
trial judges to puzzle their way through this thorny issue of public
policy.
CORDY, J. (dissenting). The opinion of Justice Ireland (and the two Justices
who join him) would recognize a new duty vastly expanding the potential
liability of a physician to persons with whom the physician has had no
contact or relationship. This duty is not compelled by our precedents,
nor does it reflect "existing social values and customs and appropriate
social policy," Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 292 (1993). To
the contrary, the duty would interfere with, and distort, the highly
personal, confidential physician-patient relationship, recognized since
the time of Hippocrates, circa 400 B.C. [18] It would
alter a physician's affirmative duty to care for his patient by introducing
a new audience to which the physician must attend -- everyone who might
come in contact with the patient. It would create an unlimited number
of third parties who might now demand to know precisely what a doctor
and patient have discussed regarding medication and treatment, threatening
our strongly held policy of confidentiality with respect to such communication.
While Justice Ireland attempts to cast the duty he would impose as limited
in scope and mild in effect, it would establish a principle with broad
and troubling implications. Because I find this to be unwarranted and
ill advised, I respectfully dissent.
The plaintiff offers three arguments supporting her claim that the doctor
owed the decedent a legal duty: (1) the doctor voluntarily assumed a
duty; (2) the doctor has a "special relationship" with his
patient thereby creating a duty to third parties; and (3) the doctor
created a reasonably foreseeable risk to the decedent (ordinary negligence).
I agree with Justice Ireland's rejection of the first two of these arguments. [19], [20] I
disagree with his acceptance of the third.
Justice Ireland's reasoning begins with the axiom that a physician has
a duty to warn a patient of potential side effects when prescribing medications.
Ante at (Ireland, J., concurring), citing Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436
Mass. 316, 321 (2002) (Cottam). [21] He then notes
that, when those side effects (such as drowsiness or dizziness) could "diminish
a patient's mental capacity, this warning serves to protect the patient
from . . . the foreseeable risk of an automobile accident." Ante
at (Ireland, J., concurring). He further points out that in the case
of automobile accident, the class of legally foreseeable victims includes "other
motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians." Ante at (Ireland, J., concurring).
From this, he would concludes that a physician "owes a duty of care
to all those foreseeably put at risk by his failure to warn about the
effects of the treatment he provides to his patients." Ante at (Ireland,
J., concurring).
In my view, this reasoning does not adequately address the principal
issue in this case, which is not the duty of a doctor to a patient, or
the duty of a patient-driver to an accident victim, but the duty of a
doctor to the victim of a patient's negligent conduct. There is no debate
that it is foreseeable that the victims of an impaired driver are not
only the driver but other drivers, pedestrians, or cyclists. The impaired
driver plainly has a duty to all potential (foreseeable) victims. But
extending the duty of the driver's physician, grounded in the doctor-patient
relationship, to all those whom the driver encounters is entirely different.
Because A has a duty to B, and B has a duty to C, it does not necessarily
follow that A has a duty to C. The duty of A to C must be established
on its own terms.
That the harm was caused directly by Sacca rather than Dr. Florio is
not necessarily fatal to the plaintiff's argument that Dr. Florio owed
a duty to the victim of Sacca's negligence. As Justice Ireland states,
we have in certain limited circumstances recognized a duty where an "unreasonably
dangerous condition [created by a defendant] involves the foreseeable
criminal or negligent conduct of an intermediary." Ante at (Ireland,
J., concurring), citing Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 147 (2006) (Jupin).
In Jupin, we concluded that a homeowner who allowed the storage of dangerous
instrumentalities (firearms) in her home, and permitted a person whom
she knew to have had a history of violence and mental instability unfettered
access to that home, owed a duty of reasonable care (with respect to
the storage of those guns) to a police officer who was subsequently shot
by that person with one of the guns stolen from an (allegedly) unsecured
cabinet in the home. We imposed this duty after careful consideration
of the extremely dangerous nature of the instrumentality, a statutory
framework that required gun owners to ensure that their firearms were "'secured
in a locked container' when stored" (G. L. c. 140, § 131L [a]),
and after concluding that the creation of the duty would not expose homeowners
to "endless liability and litigation" over the acts of "innumerable
persons." Id. at 152-154.
I would not equate the "unreasonably dangerous condition" created
by the homeowner in Jupin with a doctor's prescription of medication
necessary to the treatment of a patient. But that is in essence what
Justice Ireland would do. Moreover, he would justify the imposition of
this new duty on the supposition that this is but a minimal step. A physician,
after all, he reasons, is already obliged to warn his patient of potential
side effects of medications. Cottam, supra at 321. Given that duty, the
argument goes, it is inconsequential to extend the duty to others. "The
duty described here," Justice Ireland claims, "requires nothing
from a doctor that is not already required by his duty to his patient." Ante
at (Ireland, J., concurring). To accept this justification, however,
one must presume that the addition of a duty to third parties will have
no effect on the nature of the duty of care owed by a doctor to his patient.
Such a presumption is not supported by the nature of a physician's duty
to warn his patients about the potential side effects of medications
and other treatments.
A duty to warn generally arises in cases involving a product with an
inherent danger. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass.
629, 631 (1986) (manufacturer of product has duty to warn all foreseeable
users of dangers in use of that product of which he knows or should have
known). This duty does not arise from of any affirmative relationship
between a manufacturer and a user, but from a duty a manufacturer has
to act reasonably. In the physician-patient context, however, the duty
to warn is part of the duty of care the physician has for the patient.
Cottam, supra at 322. That duty rarely involves warnings akin to information
a manufacturer might give to potential users of its products, such as, "do
not insert your finger between the rotating blades." Rather, it
involves a process of communication and decision-making aimed at the
well-being of the patient, and the patient alone, in which the advantages
and risks of particular treatments are discussed and weighed. See St.
Germain v. Pfeifer, 418 Mass. 511, 520 (1994); Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 41 comment c (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005) ("Unlike most duties, the physician's duty to the patient
is explicitly relational: physicians owe a duty of care to patients" [emphasis
in original]).
The special nature of the duty to warn in the context of the doctor-patient
relationship (as contrasted with the manufacturer-user context) is evident
in this court's reasoning in Cottam. In that case, we held that the "physician
[not the pharmacy] is the appropriate person to perform the duty of warning
a patient of the possible side effects of prescription drugs," id.
at 322, adopting the rationale that "[p]hysicians, after considering
the history and needs of their patients and the qualities of the drug,
are required to inform their patients of those side effects they determine
are necessary and relevant for patients to know in making an informed
decision," id. at 321. The court went on to conclude that the physician's
duty to inform of potential side effects of medication he prescribes
is so central to the treatment of a patient that involving others in
it (such as the pharmacy) would "interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship." Id. at 321, citing McKee v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 701, 711 (1989).
"Interfere" is a strong word. In using it, the court confirmed
a strong policy of maintaining that relationship as autonomous, free
from the influence of concerns beyond the patient's well-being. This
reflects long-held norms about the relationship between doctor and patient
and the sound social policy that a doctor's interest be solely in the
well-being of his patient. The duty proposed by Justice Ireland today,
however, would do exactly what Cottam sought to avoid: it would interfere
with and distort the doctor-patient relationship. Claiming that the duty
he would impose would require nothing more of a doctor than is already
required, a simple duty to warn, Justice Ireland misapprehends the nature
of the duty to a patient, and fails to consider the distorting effect
of insinuating the doctor's concerns about third parties into his decisions
about the treatment of a patient. Justice Ireland avoids the problem
of this distortion by suggesting that it is no distortion at all.
A nuanced communication between doctor and patient works well (and is
presumably highly preferable) where a doctor's concern is focused solely
on what, in his or her judgment, the patient's own situation requires.
With his or her attention now, necessarily, also directed elsewhere,
however, the doctor may, understandably, become less concerned about
the particular requirements of any given patient, and more concerned
with protecting himself or herself from lawsuits by the potentially vast
number of person who will interact with and may fall victim to that patient's
conduct outside of the treatment setting. The substance and extent of
the doctor's advice and judgment about "warnings" will necessarily
be affected. Is the doctor to tell a patient whenever a medication is
prescribed that might in some circumstance cause drowsiness or fainting, "Do
not drive. Do not hold your grandchild. Do not carry grocery bags to
your car. In fact, do not do anything that involves interacting with
another person?" Or will the patient now routinely be handed a printout
of all possible side effects of any medication prescribed by the doctor
and be asked to read and sign it in the physician's office, as a substitute
for a discussion more tailored to the physician's judgment about what
the patient's situation requires and what the patient needs to know in
order to make an informed decision? This is not an alarmist reading of
Justice Ireland's concurring opinion. The natural extension of its logic
protrudes beyond the question whether any "warning" regarding
side effects was given into the adequacy and completeness of that warning
as concerns all possible side effects.
Even were I to accept Justice Ireland's claim that the duty he would
impose would will not, in reality, change the treatment decisions and
advice of doctors, I would still be concerned by the vast increase in
litigation it would invite. Justice Ireland's concurring opinion uses
the most restrained language on this point, admitting only that "[a]llowing
a larger number of potential plaintiffs may result in some increase in
litigation . . . ." Ante at (Ireland, J., concurring). This is a
significant understatement. Almost everyone is, at some point in their
lives, under the care of a doctor. This care often involves medication
(or treatment) that might conceivably cause some impairment of the patient's
faculties. If there were now a duty owed by doctors to parties injured
by their patients, the doctor would be a potential defendant whenever
the reaction of the patient to a medication is a possible contributor
to an injury. Accordingly, it is hard to imagine a plaintiff's attorney
failing in negligence cases to sue not just the negligent party who caused
the injury but also his or her doctor. Even if the majority of these
claims eventually did not result in verdicts for plaintiffs, the fact
that they could be brought would increase costs and (in my view) modify
the behavior of doctors in a way not necessarily helpful to patients. [22] Both
of these would be undesirable outcomes. They severely undermine the claim
that "[s]ound public policy . . . favors a duty in these circumstances." Ante
at (Ireland, J., concurring).
Allowing such suits against doctors would also threaten the confidentiality
inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. Patient privacy is a matter
of great public concern. That concern has translated into strong statutory
and regulatory protections for the privacy of patient records at both
the State and Federal level. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, and
privacy regulations promulgated pursuant to its Title II at 45 C.F.R.
Parts 160 and 164 (2007). See also G. L. c. 111, § 70E (patients' rights).
A patient's decision to sue his doctor in malpractice implies a waiver
of that confidentiality for purposes of the suit. In contrast, there
is no such implied waiver in cases in which the doctor is sued by an
injured party who is not the doctor's patient. How are doctors to respond
when faced with inquiries from third parties about discussions they have
had with patients about their treatments? Statutes as well as professional
codes of ethics constrain how a doctor can answer such inquiries. Yet
if there is now imposed on the doctor a duty to the party making the
inquiry, this places doctors in an untenable situation.
Because the duty Justice Ireland (and the Justices who join him) would
recognize might fundamentally alter the relationship between doctor and
patient, and increase significantly the costs of health care, contrary
to sound policy, and because such a duty is plainly not warranted by
any existing precedent, I respectfully dissent. [23]
FOOTNOTES:
-
Of the estate of Kevin Coombes.
-
The plaintiff also sued Sacca for negligence
and wrongful death. Sacca died in August, 2002, and a stipulation
of dismissal with prejudice entered in February, 2005.
-
At least one of the drugs is sometimes accompanied
by a warning from the pharmacy not to operate heavy machinery or
vehicles. There is no evidence of whether the bottles containing
Sacca's medication had such a warning. The presence of such a warning
label would not diminish Dr. Florio's duty to warn of side effects.
As a general rule it is the duty of a physician, and not a pharmacist,
to warn of side effects of medication. See Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy,
436 Mass. 316, 321-323 (2002).
-
The judge's decision did not address the plaintiff's
alternative theories of ordinary negligence and assumed duty, discussed
infra.
-
The complaint does not allege negligence resulting
from a failure to warn Sacca of the dangers of driving due to the
underlying health problems for which Dr. Florio was treating him.
Dr. Florio's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's opposition
to that motion are similarly limited. Although the plaintiff raised
this argument in a hearing before the judge and in her brief to this
court, the complaint was not amended to include that claim, and Dr.
Florio did not expressly or impliedly consent to its inclusion. See
Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (b), 365 Mass. 761 (1974). Cf. Graham v. Quincy
Food Serv. Employees Ass'n & Hosp. Library & Pub. Employees
Union, 407 Mass. 601, 615-616 (1990). Therefore, the plaintiff's
argument regarding a duty to warn of the risk of driving with health
problems was not before the court.
-
A duty voluntarily assumed must be performed
with due care. Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 52 (1983),
and cases cited. Had Dr. Florio assumed a duty to warn Sacca not
to drive, his performance of that duty would be measured against
the standard of a person with the skill and competence of a physician.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 comment b (1965). Thus, whether
Dr. Florio's duty to warn arises as an assumed duty or as a duty
based on traditional negligence principles, the scope of the resulting
duty to warn would be identical. See Woods v. O'Neil, 54 Mass. App.
Ct. 768, 771-772 n.5 (2002); Croall v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 957, 960 (1988). Because I conclude that
he owed a duty to Coombes under ordinary negligence principles, I
do not address the plaintiff's theory of assumed duty. The plaintiff's
alternative theory of special relationship is discussed infra.
-
The plaintiff claims that Dr. Florio was negligent
both for failing to warn of side effects and for omitting a separate
warning not to drive. Although the issue is not reached here, several
courts have held that a physician owes no duty to third parties to
warn of obvious dangers. See Weigold v. Patel, 81 Conn. App. 347,
357-358 (2004) (no duty to warn of dangers of driving when patient
knew medication caused drowsiness and impaired her ability to operate
automobile); Young v. Wadsworth, 916 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) (no duty to warn patient with history of blackouts not to drive
where danger of doing so was open and obvious). Under this approach
a jury could conclude that Dr. Florio gave a warning of potential
side effects that obviously implied that it would be dangerous to
drive while under the influence of the drugs. The same jury could
conclude that Dr. Florio had satisfied his duty of reasonable care
even if he provided no specific warning not to drive.
-
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical Harm § 37 comment a at 710 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005), supports this distinction in the application of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). Indeed the comment appears to disavow
Dr. Florio's interpretation of § 315:
"Section 315 of the Second Restatement stated a more specific
rule subsumed within § 314 that an actor owed no duty to control
third parties, subject to stated exceptions. Section 315, however,
neglected to clarify that its no-duty rule was conditioned on the
actor having played no role in facilitating the third party's conduct,
such as providing a dangerous weapon to an insane individual." Id.
-
The interpretation given to Cottam v. CVS
Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 321-322 (2002), by Chief Justice Marshall,
post at & n.1 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting), is more limited than
that expressed in the Cottam decision itself. The Cottam court reasoned: "The
rationale for [applying the learned intermediary doctrine to prescription
drug manufacturers] is that physicians have the duty to inform themselves
about the drug and warn their patients as they deem necessary. Physicians,
after considering the history and needs of their patients and the
qualities of the drug, are required to inform their patients of those
side effects they determine are necessary and relevant for patients
to know in making an informed decision. . . . Requiring the manufacturer
to provide warnings directly to the consumer would interfere with
the doctor-patient relationship." Id. at 321, citing McKee v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 701, 709 & 711 (1989).
We held that, "[b]ecause the physician is the appropriate person
to perform the duty of warning a patient of the possible side effects
of prescription drugs, we now extend [the learned intermediary] doctrine
to pharmacies." Id. at 322. My understanding of the import of
the Cottam decision, set forth above, is correct.
-
For example, if the physician is prescribing
a sleep aid, the physician should provide the patient with a warning,
consistent with the manufacturer's warning, that with respect to
driving a motor vehicle, the patient should avoid taking the sleep
aid with alcohol and should not drive, or operate heavy machinery,
until the patient knows how he or she will react to the sleep aid,
and that the patient should avoid engaging in all hazardous activities
(such as operating a motor vehicle or heavy machinery) immediately
after taking the sleep aid.
-
I take issue with the Chief Justice Marshall's
pronouncement, post at (Marshall, C.J., dissenting), that the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i, in McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
98 Haw. 296, 300 (2002), "expressly disavow[ed] the 'special
relationship' analysis as 'inapplicable' in a case with strikingly
similar facts" to this one. The Hawaii court did reject a physician-patient
relationship analysis, but did so in the context of evaluating a
claim involving a physician's misfeasance, i.e., the negligent prescription
of medication, and not in the context of a claim involving a physician's
nonfeasance, i.e., the physician's failure to warn. See id. at 300 & n.4.
The Hawaii court's conclusion, that "a logical reason exists
to impose upon physicians, for the benefit of third parties, a duty
to advise their patients that a medication may affect the patient's
driving ability when such a duty would otherwise be owed to the patient," almost
exactly mirrors my own. Id. at 308. Further, the Hawaii court expressly
based that conclusion, as do I, on considerations that (1) a physician
has superior knowledge of the risks of which a patient might otherwise
be unaware; (2) warning against driving might prevent substantial
harm; and (3) imposing a duty on physicians would create little additional
burden because the same duty (to warn) already is owed a patient.
I remain unconvinced, however, of the correctness of the Hawaii court's
fourth expressed rationale, that "the majority of jurisdictions
appear to recognize [such] a duty under some circumstances." Id.
at 307. Other jurisdictions appear to me to be evenly divided on
the issue.
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The citation to § 41 comment h of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 41 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005), post at (Marshall, C.J., dissenting), is uncharacteristically
imprecise. A more complete, and therefore more accurate, quotation
of comment h (that focuses primarily on circumstances in which a
physician treats a patient with a communicable disease) is as follows:
"The physician-patient relationship is not among the
relationships listed in this Section as creating an affirmative
duty. That does not mean that physicians have no affirmative
duty to third persons. Some of the obligations of physicians
to third parties, such as with patients who are HIV infected,
have been addressed by [L]egislatures. In other areas, the
case law is sufficiently mixed, the factual circumstances
sufficiently varied, and the policies sufficiently balanced
that this Restatement leaves to further development the question
of when physicians have a duty to use reasonable care or
some more limited duty -- such as to warn only the patient
-- to protect third persons. In support of a duty is the
fact that an affirmative duty for physicians would be analogous
to the affirmative duty imposed on mental-health professionals.
. . . In fact, the burden on a physician may be less than
that on a psychiatrist, because the costs of breaching confidentiality
may be lower. Diagnostic techniques may be more reliable
for physical disease and the risks that it poses than for
mental disease and its risks.
"Many courts have imposed an affirmative duty on physicians
when the patient would have preferred a warning or other
precaution to benefit a family member or other person with
whom a patient has a relationship. . . . On the other hand,
some courts are concerned that any precaution a physician
might take would have little or no effect in reducing the
risk, especially for warnings to patients about risks of
which they were already aware. These courts might lack confidence
in their ability accurately to address factual causation
in these cases. They may also be concerned with the administrative
costs entailed in identifying the few cases in which causation
exists. This Restatement takes no position on how these competing
concerns should be resolved.
"If a court does impose an affirmative duty to nonpatients,
it must address both the content of the duty and the question
of who can recover. For example, a court might limit the
scope of a physician's duty to warning the patient of risks
that the patient poses to others. A court might then hold
that the physician's liability extends to any person harmed
by the patient's condition or a more limited class based
on relationship with the patient, time, or place."
-
I also would reject the plaintiff's theory
that Dr. Florio voluntarily assumed a duty to warn, for reasons set
forth by Justice Cordy, post at n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
-
Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316 (2002)
(Cottam), does not impose a duty on a physician to warn his patient
of every side effect of every drug he prescribes, let alone every
treatment he recommends. Justice Ireland declares that he does "not
imply that Dr. Florio owed a duty to Coombes [the decedent] to warn
of every side effect of every drug he prescribed," ante at (Ireland,
J., concurring), but only that Dr. Florio had some (unspecified)
duty to give some (unspecified) warnings to his patient in light
of "the number and nature of drugs prescribed, the age and health
of the patient, and the earlier assurance about the ability of the
patient to drive," ante at (Ireland, J., concurring). This purported
qualification creates confusion at the very point where clarity is
required. Which side effects of which drugs could Dr. Florio have
ignored? What difference does his patient's age make? Lacking clarity
about the scope of the required duty to warn, physicians would proceed
at their peril if they exercised their professional judgment to warn
a patient only of side effects of prescription medications they "deem
necessary." Cottam, supra at 321.
-
As described more fully by Justice Cordy,
post at n.6 (Cordy, J., dissenting), the breadth of Justice Ireland's
conclusion that any treatment -- even those not involving prescription
medications -- imposes a "duty of care" to third parties
is unsupported by the cases from other jurisdictions on which he
relies. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
98 Haw. 296, 308 (2002) ("we believe that a logical reason exists
to impose upon physicians, for the benefit of third parties, a duty
to advise their patients that a medication may affect the patient's
driving ability when such a duty would otherwise be owed to the patient");
Joy v. Eastern Me. Med. Ctr., 529 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1987) ("when
a doctor knows, or reasonably should know that his patient's ability
to drive has been affected [by prescribed medications], he has a
duty to the driving public as well as to the patient to warn his
patient of that fact"); Hardee v. Bio-Med. Applications of S.
C., Inc., 370 S.C. 511, 516 (2006) (recognizing physician's duty
to "the motoring public" to warn patient of the risks of
operating a motor vehicle arising from physician's treatment); Burroughs
v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tenn. 2003) (physician owed duty of
care to patient and to members of the motoring public to warn patient "of
the possible adverse effect of the two prescribed drugs on his ability
to safely operate a motor vehicle").
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The duty proposed by Justice Greaney would
be imposed only on physicians who prescribed medications that the
physician has reason to know may affect the patient's ability to
drive a motor vehicle safely. Ante at (Greaney, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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The attempt to limit the duty Justice Greaney
would impose on physicians, i.e., that a physician should give a
warning "consistent with the manufacturer's warning" and
that a physician should warn a patient that he "should not drive,
or operate heavy machinery, until the patient knows how he or she
will react" to a particular prescribed medication, ante at n.2
(Greaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), does not
in fact place any boundaries around the duty he would recognize.
The appropriateness of a physician's warning will always be called
into question when a third party is injured. In this case there is
evidence that the patient had driven without difficulty while taking
the prescribed medications. Under Justice Greaney's formulation the
jury will now be permitted, indeed required, to delve into the nature
of the warning given and to determine for themselves whether it was
adequate, imposing liability on a physician who may have given a
warning but one the jury deem not adequate.
-
The Oath of Hippocrates, taken by many physicians,
provides in part: "[W]hatsoever I shall see or hear in the
course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse
with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never
divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets." 1 Hippocrates
301 (W.H.S. Jones, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984).
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The first, that the doctor voluntarily assumed
a duty to the decedent, clearly fails. Insofar as the doctor voluntarily
assumed a duty to anyone, it was to his patient, not to the plaintiff's
decedent. The plaintiff offers no legal support for the proposition
that a doctor's assumption of a duty to a patient constitutes an
assumption of a duty to a third party. Moreover, it is not correct
to speak of a doctor assuming or not assuming a "duty to warn" his
patient about the effects of medications. Ante at n.5 (Ireland, J.,
concurring). Informing a patient about the risks and effects of medication
is not a separate duty a doctor voluntarily assumes; rather, it is
part and parcel of the doctor's duty of care for the patient, grounded
in the doctor-patient relationship. See Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436
Mass. 316, 322 (2002) (Cottam).
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The plaintiff's special relationship
argument is similarly without merit. A person ordinarily has
no duty to protect a third party against the dangerousness or
unlawful acts of others, Luoni v. Berube, 431 Mass. 729, 731
(2000), except where there is a "special relationship" between
the actor (here the driver) and the person (the doctor) that
imposes a duty on the latter to control the former. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315 (a) (1965). In the category of special
relationships, we have recognized at common law the duty of a
parent to control a minor child, the duty of a master to control
the conduct of his servant, and the duty of a possessor of land
or chattels to control the conduct of his licensee. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts, supra at §§ 316-318; Luoni v. Berube, supra.
There is no duty of a physician to control his patient. This
court has also recognized a "special relationship" in
situations where the duty to control is premised, at least in
part, on a responsibility created by statute. Most prevalent
in this category are cases involving the sale and consumption
of alcoholic beverages, an area highly regulated by statute.
See, e.g., Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984) (town liable to
injured motorist where police had released intoxicated driver
back onto roadway); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498
(1968) (bar owner could be held liable to those injured by patron
to whom bar negligently served excessive quantities of alcoholic
beverages). Cf. Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390
Mass. 6, 10-11 (1983), quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J.
188, 201-202 (1959) (finding prohibition on sale of liquor to
minors, G. L. c. 138, §§ 34, 69, intended "for the protection
of members of the general public as well"). See also Jean
W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496, 498-499 (1993) (Liacos, C.J.,
concurring) (duty on part of parole officers to ensure parolees
not erroneously released). The physician-patient relationship
is not a "special relationship" creating a duty to
third parties. The relationship is not one of control, as a parent
would have over her child; it is not one of statutory responsibility,
as an officer would have for the safety of the public when encountering
a drunk driver. Rather, the physician-patient relationship involves
an affirmative duty to care, only for the well-being of the patient
in the course of treatment. St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 418 Mass.
511, 520 (1994). Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical Harm § 41 comment c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
2005) ("Unlike most duties, the physician's duty to the
patient is explicitly relational: physicians owe a duty of care
to patients" [emphasis in original]). Premising a physician's
duty to third parties on a "special relationship" with
his patient would transform the physician's duty of care for
his patient into an obligation to control the patient. This is
not an accurate characterization of the relationship between
physician and patient.
-
Justice Greaney would go further positing
that the physician has a duty to warn not only of the potential side
effects of medications (e.g., drowsiness or dizziness), but also
whether the patient should drive at all while taking them. Ante at
(Greaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Having expressed little concern that the
duty he would impose would spur an increase in litigation, Justice
Ireland then "leave[s] to the Legislature the task of determining
whether to impose further limits on doctors' liability." Ante
at (Ireland, J., concurring). This implies that a decision in this
area should take little account of the consequences on tort litigation.
Yet a decision to impose a duty is at heart a decision about values
and social policy, including the value of limiting or expanding the
possibility of litigation under given circumstances. See Cremins
v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 292 (1993) (existence of duty of care decided "by
reference to existing social values and customs and appropriate social
policy").
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We are not the first State to address the
question. In circumstances similar to this case, two States have
declined to impose on doctors a duty to third parties harmed by a
patient. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 117 Ill. 2d
507 (1987); Calwell v. Hassan, 260 Kan. 769 (1996). The Supreme Court
of Hawai'i, in contrast, did recognize such a duty in similar circumstances.
McKenzie v. Hawai'i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 98 Haw. 296, 307-309
(2002). The Hawai'i court emphasized that it meant to impose only
a duty to warn the patient not to drive, a duty which the court proclaimed
the doctor already had. Two other cases relied on by Justice Ireland
are readily distinguishable. See Hardee v. Bio-Med. Applications
of S.C., Inc., 370 S.C. 511, 516 (2006); Joy v. Eastern Me. Med.
Ctr., 529 A.2d 1364 (Me. 1987). Both cases involved patients who
received treatments and medications administered by the doctor in
his office. Although the treatments caused impairment, the patients
were allowed to leave the office before the impairment subsided,
resulting in accidents. The duty in those cases rests squarely on
the present control the doctors had over their patients. In contrast,
this case presents a patient administering prescription medication
to himself, at home, over a course of many months. The elements of
present control and temporal proximity, so central to the reasoning
of the courts in the South Carolina and Maine cases, are lacking
here. This distinction was critical to two decisions by the Supreme
Court of New Mexico. Compare Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511
(1989) (physician owed duty to driving public when administering
drugs to patient in office), with Lester v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404 (1998)
(no duty where medication taken away from office, injury caused remote
in time).