Forensic Psychiatry & Medicine: Employment Issues/What's New?

Forensic Psychiatry & Medicine

ADA
What's New?

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472 (U.S.))

67 USLW 3682, 9 A.D. Cases 691, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4857, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6259, 1999 CJ C.A.R. 3749
Vaughn L. MURPHY, Petitioner, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. No. 97-1992. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 27, 1999. Decided June 22, 1999.
Employee, whose mechanics position required him to drive commercial vehicles, sued employer under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when he was fired upon discovery that his blood pressure exceeded Department of Transportation (DOT) health certification requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas, 946 F.Supp. 872, entered summary judgment for employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Mechanic petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held that: (1) determination whether employee's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs; (2) employee's high blood pressure did not substantially limit his major life activities when he was medicated for his position and thus he was not disabled under ADA; and (3) employee was not "regarded as" substantially limited in major life activity of working by reason of his dismissal for inability to obtain DOT certification as he remained generally employable in mechanics positions that did not require driving commercial vehicle.
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined.
Murphy v. U.P.S.

[1]
78 CIVIL RIGHTS
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited
78I(B) Employment Practices
78k173 Discrimination by Reason of Handicap, Disability or Illness

78k173.1 k. In general.
U.S.,1999.
Under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), determination whether employee's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.
Murphy v. U.P.S.
[2]
78 CIVIL RIGHTS
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited
78I(B) Employment Practices
78k173 Discrimination by Reason of Handicap, Disability or Illness

78k173.1 k. In general.
U.S.,1999.
Employee was not "disabled" due to his high blood pressure, within meaning of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where, when he was medicated for his condition, his high blood pressure did not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
Murphy v. U.P.S.
[3]
78 CIVIL RIGHTS
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited
78I(B) Employment Practices
78k173 Discrimination by Reason of Handicap, Disability or Illness

78k173.1 k. In general.
U.S.,1999.
Employee is "regarded as disabled" within the meaning of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) if covered entity mistakenly believes that employee's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
Murphy v. U.P.S.
[4]
78 CIVIL RIGHTS
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited
78I(B) Employment Practices
78k173 Discrimination by Reason of Handicap, Disability or Illness

78k173.1 k. In general.
U.S.,1999.
To be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working for purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employee must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
Murphy v. U.P.S.
[5]
78 CIVIL RIGHTS
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited
78I(B) Employment Practices
78k173 Discrimination by Reason of Handicap, Disability or Illness

78k173.1 k. In general.
U.S.,1999.
Mechanic who was fired because he had hypertension that prevented him from obtaining Department of Transportation (DOT) health certification for operation of commercial vehicles, which was essential function of his job, was not "regarded as" disabled, or substantially limited in the major life activity of working, for purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); at most, mechanic was regarded as unable to perform job of mechanic when that job required driving commercial motor vehicle, rather than unable to perform other mechanic jobs that did not require driving commercial vehicles, and thus he was not unable to perform class of jobs by reason of his high blood pressure. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.
Syllabus [FN*]

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *1 (U.S.))

Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), hired petitioner as a mechanic, a position that required him to drive commercial vehicles. To drive, he had to satisfy certain Department of Transportation (DOT) health certification requirements, including having "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." 49 CFR § 391.41(b)(6). Despite petitioner's high blood pressure, he was erroneously granted certification and commenced work. After the error was discovered, respondent fired him on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements. Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), the District Court granted respondent summary judgment, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Citing its decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902, aff'd, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 1999 WL 407488, that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his doctor testified that when medicated, petitioner functions normally in everyday activities. The court also affirmed the District Court's determi-nation that petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA, explaining that respondent did not terminate him on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or stroke, but because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for commercial vehicle drivers.
Held:
1. Under the ADA, the determination whether petitioner's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. Sutton, --- U.S., at ----, --- S.Ct., at ----, 1999 WL 407488. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before this Court, there is no occasion here to consider whether he is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. P. ----.
2. Petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. Under Sutton, --- U.S., at ----, --- S.Ct., at ----, 1999 WL 407488, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the ADA's meaning if, among other things, a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification. When referring to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Thus, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. Assuming without deciding that the EEOC regulations are valid, the Court concludes that the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle--a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. He has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that he is generally employable as a mechanic, and there is uncontroverted evidence that he could perform a number of mechanic jobs. Consequently, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Pp. ---- - ----.
*2

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *2 (U.S.))

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *3 (U.S.))

Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the ADA in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. It held that, to determine whether petitioner is disabled under the ADA, his "impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state." 946 F.Supp., at 881. Noting that when petitioner is medicated he is inhibited only in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally, the court held that petitioner is not "disabled" under the ADA. Id., at 881-882. The court also rejected petitioner's claim that he was "regarded as" disabled, holding that respondent "did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations." Id., at 882.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. 141 F.3d 1185 (C.A.10 1998) (judgt.order). Citing its decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (C.A.10 1997), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 1999 WL 407488 (1999), that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the court held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated, he " 'functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The court also affirmed the District Court's determination that petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. It explained that respondent did not terminate petitioner "on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or stroke," but "because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles." Id., at 5a. We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 790, 142 L.Ed.2d 653 (1999), and we now affirm.
II [1][2] The first question presented in this case is whether the determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that holding, the result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Petitioner did not seek, and we did not grant, certiorari on whether this conclusion was correct. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities should be made without consideration of mitigating measures. Consequently, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor on the claim that petitioner is substantially limited in one or more major life activities and thus disabled under the ADA.
III*4

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *4 (U.S.))

[3] The second issue presented is also largely resolved by our opinion in Sutton. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. As we held in Sutton, --- U.S., at ----, --- S.Ct., at ----, ante, p. 15,, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, petitioner alleges that his hypertension is regarded as substantially limiting him in the major life activity of working, when in fact it does not. To support this claim, he points to testimony from respondent's resource manager that respondent fired petitioner due to his hypertension, which he claims evidences respondent's belief that petitioner's hypertension--and consequent inability to obtain DOT certification--substantially limits his ability to work. In response, respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life activity of working but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification.
As a preliminary matter, we note that there remains some dispute as to whether petitioner meets the requirements for DOT certification. As discussed above, petitioner was incorrectly granted DOT certification at his first examination when he should have instead been found unqualified. See supra, at ----. Upon retesting, although petitioner's blood pressure was not low enough to qualify him for the one-year certification that he had incorrectly been issued, it was sufficient to qualify him for optional temporary DOT health certification. App. 98a-102a (Medical Regulatory Criteria). Had a physician examined petitioner and, in light of his medical history, declined to issue a temporary DOT certification, we would not second-guess that decision. Here, however, it appears that UPS determined that petitioner could not meet the DOT standards and did not allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary certification. Id., at 84a-86a (testimony of Monica Sloan, UPS's company nurse); id., at 54a-55a (testimony and affidavit of Vaughn Murphy). We need not resolve the question of whether petitioner could meet the standards for DOT health certification, however, as it goes only to whether petitioner is qualified and whether respondent has a defense based on the DOT regulations, see Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 1999 WL 407456--issues not addressed by the court below or raised in the petition for certiorari.
[4] The only issue remaining is whether the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification (regardless of whether he can, in fact, obtain optional temporary certification) is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in one or more major life activities. As in Sutton, --- U.S., at ---- - ----, --- S.Ct., at ---- - ----, ante, at 18-19, we assume, arguendo, that the EEOC regulations regarding the disability determination are valid. When referring to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines "substantially limits" as: "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998). The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the] geographical area [reasonably accessible to the individual], from which the individual is also disqualified." § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). Thus, to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. See § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working").
*5

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *5 (U.S.))

[5] Again, assuming without deciding that these regulations are valid, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as disabled. Petitioner was fired from the position of UPS mechanic because he has a physical impairment--hypertension-- that is regarded as preventing him from obtaining DOT health certification. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a (UPS terminated Murphy because "his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles"); 946 F.Supp., at 882 ("[T]he court concludes UPS did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations"); App. 125a, & ¶ 18 (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) ("UPS considers driving commercial motor vehicles an essential function of plaintiff's job as mechanic"); App. 103a (testimony of John R. McMahon) (stating that the reason why petitioner was fired was that he "did not meet the requirements of the Department of Transportation").
The evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle--a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. 49 CFR § 390.5 (defining "commercial motor vehicle" as a vehicle weighing over 10,000 pounds, designed to carry 16 or more passengers, or used in the transportation of hazardous materials). Petitioner has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that petitioner is generally employable as a mechanic. Petitioner has "performed mechanic jobs that did not require DOT certification" for "over 22 years," and he secured another job as a mechanic shortly after leaving UPS. 946 F.Supp., at 875, 876. Moreover, respondent presented uncontroverted evidence that petitioner could perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and gas-welding equipment mechanic, all of which utilize petitioner's mechanical skills. See App. 115a (report of Lewis Vierling).
Consequently, in light of petitioner's skills and the array of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, --- U.S., at ---- - ----, --- S.Ct., at ---- - ----, ante at 19-20. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on petitioner's claim that he is regarded as disabled. For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
*6

(Cite as: 1999 WL 407472, *6 (U.S.))

It is so ordered.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BREYER joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 1999 WL 407488, I respectfully dissent. I believe that petitioner has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA because, assuming petitioner's uncontested evidence to be true, his very severe hypertension--in its unmedicated state-- "substantially limits" his ability to perform several major life activities. Without medication, petitioner would likely be hospitalized. See App. 81. Indeed, unlike Sutton, this case scarcely requires us to speculate whether Congress intended the Act to cover individuals with this impairment. Severe hypertension, in my view, easily falls within the ADA's nucleus of covered impairments. See Sutton, --- U.S., at ---- - ----, --- S.Ct., at ---- - ---- ante, at 3-9, (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Because the Court of Appeals did not address whether petitioner was qualified or whether he could perform the essential job functions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. (C) West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

[The Wall Street Journal, West Group Publishing, June 1999]

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