Psychiatrists' Thorny Judgments
Describing and Improving Decision Making Processes
Robert M. Hamm, Ph.D.,
Jack Allen Clark, Ph.D.,
and Harold Bursztajn, M.D.
From the Center for Research on Judgment and
Policy and the Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Boulder,
Colorado, and the Program in Psychiatry and the Law, Massachusetts Mental
Health Center, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts. Please
address requests for reprints to Dr. Hamm, Center for Research on Judgment
and Policy, Box 344, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309,
USA.
The decision making method used by Climo [1] for difficult
decisions in public psychiatric hospitals is criticized for oversimplifying
the decision situation. Two methods for describing decision processes,
naturalistic observation and judgment policy analysis, are introduced
as a basis for selecting techniques for clarifying and improving decision
making in situations in which a formal decision analysis is not feasible.
(Med Decis Making 4:425-447, 1984)
Introduction
In the preceding paper [1] Dr. Lawrence Climo has presented
four examples of the difficult decision making task he faces in a public
psychiatric hospital. He has described a "thorny" situation
in which not only must the interests of patient, doctor, and society
be considered, but in which these interests are also often unclear, ambiguous,
or mutually opposed. This is a circumstance that strains not only rationality
but also the imagination.
Climo's approach to analyzing his decision situation is to recognize competing
interests, choose the most overriding one, and do so in a personally,
professionally, and politically defensible manner. This approach is unsophisticated
in comparison with the analyses usually seen in the pages of Medical
Decision Making. Yet this is not his personal failing;
for how would anyone apply decision analysis to such cases? The dilemmas
in the public psychiatric hospital offer four hurdles to the decision
analyst:
-
The situations are unique and so would need to be analyzed individually
— a process that has been shown, in hospital settings for example,
to take about two weeks' time [2] — hardly available
to the harried staff of a public psychiatric hospital.
-
It is difficult to produce a decision tree for such a situation,
i.e., to structure it in terms of available actions, possible
events, and resulting outcomes. The situation is like a game
against an opponent rather than a game against nature, and the
opponent acts crazy or diabolical — i.e., is "divided against
himself" [3] — and thus cannot be counted
on to act in his or her own best interest. Hence, one cannot
make reasonable simplifying assumptions that allow for the "pruning" of
the decision tree. This is further complicated by the laws mandating
that the sometimes incompatible rights of patient and society
be protected and providing sanctions to the doctor if they are
not.
-
Given a decision tree, it is difficult to measure the required probabilities.
As the situations are unique, no data are available about the
relative frequency of the possible events. And when the opponent
is an erratic, unpredictable, even diabolical person, the probabilities
of events are not independent of the actions the decision maker
would take (see [4]).
-
Measurement of the utility of the anticipated outcomes is difficult.
How does one evaluate an anticipated state of mental illness?
It is difficult to get the psychiatric patient's reasonable cooperation
in this evaluation process.
Enthusiasts no longer claim that decision analysis offers the solution
to every kind of medical decision problem. Researchers and practitioners
know how much hard work is involved in applying decision analysis to
routine decision problems, let alone to intractable ones such as Dr.
Climo's. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that, because a formal decision
analysis is impossible, there is no hope for him to improve his decision
making practice. As Raiffa [5] urges, the mere use of
a decision analytic perspective may be of benefit. That is, to consider
the decision in terms of actions, events, and outcomes, even if the probabilities
of events and the utilities of outcomes cannot be rigorously measured,
may make it more likely that the outcome will be good.
Even if formal decision analysis is not feasible, a psychiatrist faced
with a difficult decision might have the following goals:
-
The decision process used should have a good chance of finding the
right decision, within time, effort, and tool-availability constraints.
-
The decision process can be used consistently on a broad class of
decisions.
-
The decision process can be defended, if the decision is criticized.
-
It should be possible to teach others to use the same decision process.
-
It should be possible to evaluate the decision process and improve
it, if necessary.
-
It should be possible to involve the patient in the decision process.
To attain these goals, a number of steps will be required. Doctors' behavior
in the decision situation should be observed very closely, and the results
of these observations should be given to them. They should be shown that
the use of concepts consistent with decision analysis can improve their
decisions, and should be taught how to use these accurately. Finally,
doctors should be taught how to recognize when techniques of various
degrees of formality are feasible and appropriate.
In this paper we shall review and evaluate Climo's discussion of his thorny
decisions. We will also present some suggestions for improving both his
understanding of his difficult circumstances and his method for resolving
the problems they cause him. Section I of the paper will provide perspective
on Dr. Climo's decision process, Section I-A sketching the social nature
of medical decision making and Section I-B presenting a framework for
relating the kinds of reasoning decision makers use to the features of
the decision situation; this framework will provide a basis for suggesting
feasible techniques for making good decisions in these situations. In
Section II, the cases Climo reports will be analyzed with respect to
the kind of situation the decision presented and the kind of approach
taken by the clinicians. In Section III, some ways outside researchers
can help in clarifying the decision situation will be reviewed. In Section
IV it will be shown how the psychiatrists' decision strategy may be improved.
The particular role of the law in psychiatric decisions, and how the
psychiatrist can use this kind of aided decision, is reviewed in the
accompanying article by Bursztajn et al. [6].
I. Perspective on the Decision Process
I-A. Social Nature of Medical Decision Making
Climo's presentation of four cases and the thorny clinical judgments that
they entail serves to remind us of the social character of medical decision
making. In these cases, thorniness is a quality that inheres in the social
context of his practice. Whereas from a strictly medical/psychiatric
point of view, he may be faced with fairly straightforward problems of
diagnosis and treatment, these problems are actually exceedingly difficult
because of the troublesome social, political, and economic context in
which he finds himself and his patients. This difficult context fosters
the development of a professionally unconventional decision making method,
designed to yield socially acceptable, if not medically valid, decisions.
The case reports illustrate two major aspects of the social character
of medical decision making. First, they illustrate the significance of
social factors in clinical judgment. In a sense, Dr. Climo has to take
society as well as biomedical phenomena into account in deciding upon
a diagnosis or a course of treatment. For instance, he clearly takes
into account the interests of the court as well as those of his patient
in deciding to renew Pepe's 20-day commitment. Second, the cases illustrate
the socialized character of the decision making process itself. The cases
show Dr. Climo making decisions through a process of social interaction
with patients, judges, and fellow staff members. Thus not only does he
necessarily take social factors into account in recognizing and evaluating
alternatives and outcomes, but his cognitive process is also shared with
others and thereby subject to control by social factors.
I-B. Locating Psychiatry's Dilemmas on the Cognitive Continuum
Many modes of reasoning may be observed in medical clinics, and although
psychiatry is thought to involve particularly intuitive cognition, a
range of approaches to reasoning may be seen there as well. At the same
time, the use of a large number of decision aiding methods has been advocated,
ranging from Dr. Climo's decision method to formal decision analysis.
Hammond's Cognitive Continuum Theory [7,8]
offers a basis for selecting such aids according to the kind of cognition
prevailing in the situation. The theory characterizes cognition as being
relatively intuitive or analytical and explains how the relative analyticity
of cognition is partially determined by the task the person is thinking
about. This framework will be useful in two ways. The perspective it
provides can help us know in what situations a formal decision analysis
would be inappropriate, and its descriptions of the kinds of cognition
that are feasible in various situations can provide guidance in searching
for methods for improving decision making. For example, it provides a
framework for the development of the repertoire of utility assessment
techniques and justifications for their selection, as called for by Bursztajn
and Hamm [9].
Cognitive Continuum Theory [7,8] holds
that cognition can vary along a continuum from intuition to analysis,
and its position on this continuum is induced by the characteristics
of the task. Both cognitive mode and task can be described by lists of
characteristic features [7,8]; for
example, intuition is rapid and analysis slow; intuition tends to combine
cues with a linear weighted-average organizing principle while analysis
tends to be more complicated, etc. Indices have been produced for measuring
how analytical cognition is and how analysis-inducing tasks are [10].
Closely related to the descriptions of the tasks and the cognition they
induce is a description of the modes of scientific reasoning that are
characteristic of various positions on the cognitive continuum. Hammond
[11] has described six modes, from the reasoning in
the physics laboratory (Mode 1, most analytical) to the reasoning of
a scientist making public policy outside his or her area of expertise
(Mode 6, most intuitive). These six modes vary in a number of features,
such as the covertness of the reasoning and whether the focus is on individual
cases or on variables and relations among variables.
Two grand themes of medical reasoning are the problems of cognitive safeguards
(How can we be sure our knowledge is correct?) and of correct action
(How can we be sure our actions are correct?). The cognitive safeguards
problem has been addressed [12,13]
through descriptions of how people ensure that their thinking is correct
in each of the six modes of cognition. Five features that distinguish
among the modes have been identified [12]. Similarly,
to look at the problem of correct action from this perspective, we can
describe six distinct approaches to determining the proper action to
take, ordered along the analytical/intuitive continuum (see Table 1).
Table 1. Features Characteristic of Each Mode on the Cognitive Continuum
|
Feature |
Mode |
|
|
|
Analytical |
|
|
|
|
Intuitive |
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
Decision structure, probabilities
of events, and evaluations of outcomes are based on formal, well-established
theary. |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Probabilities and evaluations
are based on controlled measurement of events and outcomes, at
the least. |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Measurements of event
probabilities and outcomes are based on statistical summaries
of large amounts of data, at least. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
Decision model is generated
and probabilities and evaluations of outcomes are measured, subjectively,
at least. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
Actions are justified
with reference to reasons, rules, and principles, at least. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Modes 1 to 4 would involve the use of a formal decision analytical framework,
including measurement of the probabilities and utilities. These modes
differ in the analyticity of the methods used for measuring the probabilities
of events and the goodness of outcomes. The kinds of decision analysis
usually presented in the pages of Medical Decision Making are
at Modes 3 and 4. When the probabilities are measured with reference
to the relative frequencies of events in a large data base and the utilities
are measured by systematically surveying a large number of people, it
is a typical Mode 3 approach. When the probabilities and utilities are
subjectively estimated, it is a typical Mode 4 approach.
The decision making reasoning typical of Mode 5 would not involve the
explicit measurement of goodness or probability nor the calculation of
expected utilities. Rather, it would involve public discussion of the
decision with respect to principles. When decisions are made without
an attempt at justification, e.g., on the authority of the doctor's "experience," it
is likely that the most intuitive cognition, Mode 6, is involved.
In his paper, Climo has presented case descriptions where it is plain
that the decisions are made with Mode 5 cognition: reasons for the decisions
are discussed but there is no measurement. In seeking to improve the
decision making in such cases (see Section IV), it is necessary to consider
whether to try to improve the decision process at Mode 5, say by inducing
the decision makers to use the concepts of actions, events, and outcomes,
or to move the process up to Mode 4 by introducing measurement of probabilities
of events and of the goodness of outcomes. Cognitive Continuum Theory
plays a further role in improving the doctors' reasoning, in that its
detailed descriptions of the various modes of cognition will enable us
to select techniques that are compatible with the prevailing mode of
cognition.
II. The Decision Making Practice of Dr. Climo and his Staff
Our critique of the style of decision making typical in psychiatric dilemmas
must start with Climo's description of his and his staff's practice.
He has described for us a common method that they use, and he has given
us case examples. We shall evaluate this method, both as stated and as
used in the cases.
II-A. The Reported Method
Climo [1] holds that it is reasonable and good for the
psychiatric decision making team, in order to attain a happy solution
to a difficult situation, to "take into account what ordinary, well-meaning,
and responsible citizens might consider the right thing to do." He
proposes that the method for doing this has two steps.
-
To consider which of the competing interests that have been identified
feels, professionally and personally, the more overriding;
-
To consider which course of action would feel the least defensible
if the staff were called to public accounting after the fact.
We note that this procedure calls on the reactions the doctors have as
ordinary citizens as well as on their evaluations as psychiatrists. This
may well be appropriate, unless it somehow would force them to do worse
than they could, e.g., to oversimplify the case so that the ordinary
citizen could understand and approve of it from a newspaper account [1].
We shall evaluate Climo's proposed decision making method in the normative
terms of decision theory, asking, "If this procedure were generally
used, would the decisions it produced be good?" We shall show, first,
that the method is technically flawed because it could produce incoherent
recommendations and, second, that the method is substantively flawed
because it does not deal adequately with uncertainty or with the many
aspects in a situation that should be considered.
II-B. Technical Objection: The Method Could Produce Incoherent Decisions
When one routinely faces unique cases under conditions of uncertainty,
one may never have the data to evaluate whether a strategy is good or
whether an alternative strategy would lead to better outcomes in the
long run. One must evaluate the strategy by asking, instead, whether
it is consistent or coherent.
The method that Climo finds to be common for dealing with these difficult
decisions, and that he himself uses and recommends, is to identify the
overriding interest and pick the action that is most defensible (or avoid
the action that is least defensible) on this one overriding interest.
It is not clear whether "interest" means the interests of different parties (e.g.,
patient, doctor, or society) or just different aspects of the
outcomes, regardless of whose benefit is involved — most likely, the
latter. For example, in the case of Pepe, the competing "interests" might
be his discomfort on the ward and his possible benefit from the sound
diagnosis that might be produced if he were kept on the ward for further
observation. The second step of Climo's rule, that the most
defensible action should be taken, seems to represent the doctor's interests;
this implies that the first step is intended to address the
different attributes of the situation. Either way, the decision rule
can be shown to be incoherent.
The rule is incoherent because it recommends simplifying the problem so
that only one attribute (the "overriding interest") is considered;
the action is then chosen on the basis of that one attribute. The procedure
for choosing which attribute is "overriding" is intuitive,
based on "professional and personal feelings" in the situation.
Tversky [14] has demonstrated that this kind of decision
rule is capable of creating intransitive preferences, over a set of possible
options. For example, imagine that the psychiatric hospital has only
one spare bed, and you have to choose which of two patients to admit.
Say that patient B is suffering more than patient A, while patient A
has a slightly higher chance of committing suicide than patient B. You
feel that the hospital can be effective both in alleviating the suffering
and in preventing a suicide. When you compare the two patients, the difference
in suicide risk may seem less tangible than the difference in suffering,
and so you would elect to admit patient B. Next, you compare patient
B with patient C, who has a slightly smaller chance of suicide than B
but is suffering slightly more. By the same reasoning, you would now
admit patient C. Similarly, comparing D with C, you might admit D. But
if you now compare patient A with patient D, and D is suffering three
steps more than A but A presents a three-steps-higher chance of committing
suicide, the larger suicide risk of patient A might now look quite substantial,
and you might admit patient A rather than patient D. These preferences
are intransitive, for you admit patient B over (>) patient A, C > B,
D > C, but A > D. And if you were willing to release a patient in order
to admit one in greater need, you might find yourself back where you
started, with patient A occupying the bed after much unnecessary trouble.
The mechanism by which Climo's decision rule would produce such an incoherence
is that the first step, the judgment about which attribute is most important,
is made in the context of the options that are available. One basis for
deciding that an attribute is unimportant is that the difference between
the available options on that attribute are too small to be perceived
[15] or to be cared about [16]. However,
as our example and Tversky's [14] empirical demonstrations
showed, if the method were used on a (particular) series of options,
the differences that were individually too small to attend to might sum
to a difference that seemed to demand serious attention.
One would rarely encounter a set of psychiatric decisions that would so
plainly demonstrate this incoherence in Climo's decision rule. In fact,
the potential of such a flaw would not in itself prevent the method from
being a good heuristic one, a method that works well in most situations.
The possibility of intransitive decisions, however, which depend on the
vagaries of the doctor's informal judgments of what attribute is most
important, means that Dr. Climo cannot claim a special legitimacy for
his decisions due to their having been produced by the method.
II-C. Substantive Objection: The Method Systematically Ignores Information
The fact that information is systematically ignored by the decision rule
must be criticized on practical or substantive grounds. In principle,
most decisions have many relevant attributes that should be taken into
account, and most are made under conditions of uncertainty. Familiar
arguments [17] hold that methods that attend to all
the relevant aspects and to the uncertainties can potentially produce
optimal decisions (especially if there is valid measurement of the uncertainties
of events and of the utilities of outcomes). Conversely, the chance of
producing the best decision is unavoidably lessened if one uses a method
that systematically ignores aspects of the decision situation and/or
the uncertainties. This is true even when one can justify using the method
by saying truthfully that society demands a decision that can be explained
simply or that the decision is too thorny for one to handle in its full
complexity.
It is ironic that, according to Hammond's Cognitive Continuum Theory,
doctors using intuitive cognition should be particularly good at considering
a decision problem that has many aspects. The unconscious method by which
intuitive cognition combines multiple attributes of a situation in evaluations
or judgments of it is homologous to a "weighted linear average" in
which each of the attributes is attended to with different "weights" or
amounts of attention [17,18]. Although
the weights may be wrong, at least the doctor using unaided intuition
is likely to be attending to more of the factors than the doctor attempting
to simplify the problem by attending to only the overriding interest.
In proposing a method that ignores some factors, Climo may unintentionally
be promoting worse decisions than if unaided intuition were
used.
II-D. Opportunity for Bias
A further problem with systematically ignoring certain aspects of the
decision situation is that the choice of which aspect to ignore may be
made according to one of (at least) two institutionalized biases: the
bias to act defensively and the bias to seek information.
The Bias to Act Defensively. Of course it is essential that the
doctor act in such a way as to defend against the possibility of making
negligent mistakes and suffering the consequences. But this defensiveness
has costs. For example, it contributes to the overuse of diagnostic tests.
To use a method that overemphasizes some motives and downplays others,
when this defensiveness is one of the more powerful motives, is likely
to increase rather than decrease the problems associated with the defensive
practice of medicine.
The Bias to Seek Information. The case of Pepe presents an example
in which great importance is placed on obtaining an exact diagnosis.
In deciding what to do with the teenager who had been placed on a locked
ward for a 20-day observation period, yet about whom no definite diagnosis
had been reached, the staff considered:
-
The potential gain to the courts and to Pepe of keeping him for an
additional observation period; a correct diagnosis could be of
great benefit.
-
The costs to Pepe of the confinement; he found it very unpleasant.
-
The importance to the staff of discharging their institutional obligation
to the court and to society by helping the court know what to
do in this case.
It was decided that the first dimension, the value of the information
that could be gained by keeping Pepe for another 20 days, was the overriding
interest; but he killed himself after 5 of those days, perhaps motivated
by the second dimension. We simply do not know whether the outcome would
have been any different had Pepe been released. Nonetheless, oversimplification
of the attribute structure of the decision may have been critical in
this situation, because once the one dimension was labelled "important" and
the others "unimportant," the staff's attention to Pepe's discomfort
and to the possibility of his suicide may have decreased. Basing the
decision on all aspects of the case might have led to attention
to all aspects of Pepe's continuing management.
The same motivation to gain information was active in the management of
an infant who for unknown reasons was not thriving, a case described
in Chapter 1 of Medical Choices, Medical Chances [19].
In both these cases the doctors seemed to pay insufficient attention
to the fact that the observations needed to gain information had an effect
on the patient. Although the information may well be more important
than the patient's feelings, choosing to attend only to this
most important dimension can lead to a decision that is untempered by
the necessary consideration of the patient's reaction to the situation.
II-E. Climo's Case Reports
Although Climo's method of identifying the overriding attribute and determining
which actions would feel least defensible was applied in the case of
Pepe, it does not seem to have been used in all of the cases he reports.
For example, there is no mention of it in the report about Mr. Warren,
the non-communicative psychotic who would not eat hospital food. One
can criticize the handling of this case, not so much for a failure to
attend to all attributes, but for the failure to deal explicitly with
uncertainty.
In order to get the court to give the hospital control over Mr. Warren's
body, it was necessary to prevent his cousin from feeding him, until
he looked enough like an emergency for the court to give the hospital
staff the desired control. Once they had this control, they were able
to force him to eat and to take antipsychotic medicines, which brought
about the anticipated improvement in his state. (Credit is due Dr. Climo
and his team for inventing this option.) In thus trying to "shoot
the moon" they were taking a gamble. If they won, they would do
well on every relevant attribute: improved eating and lessened psychosis.
If they lost, their situation would be little different from their starting
place (unless the patient starved to death). A formal decision analysis
might well reveal that the chosen option not only had higher expected
value, but stochastically dominated any other option. However, lacking
such an analysis, we would be more comfortable with the decision process
in this case if we knew that Dr. Climo and his staff had acknowledged
in their discussion that they were taking a gamble and had considered
the possible bad outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence. Although
the problem might have been considered in these terms, there is no mention
of it in Climo's narrative.
II-F. Insufficiently Detailed Information in Climo's Account
In discussing both Pepe's and Mr. Warren's cases, we have had insufficient
information to criticize or praise the staff's decision process with
complete confidence. In the case of Mr. Warren, for example, we would
need to know more detail about whether the doctors recognized their strategy
to be a gamble and, if so, how they evaluated it. Lacking such information,
our evaluation cannot be fair to Dr. Climo and his staff, because we
do not know exactly how the decision was made. A quote from the paper
can illustrate the problem. Describing how the staff decided to keep
Pepe on the locked ward for the second 20-day observation period, Climo
writes, "All this was explained to Pepe and more time was requested" [1,
p 420]. This sentence is the standard gloss that is entered into the
patient's medical record to demonstrate that the patient's informed consent
was obtained. But it tells us nothing about how the ideas were
communicated, about what strategy was used to obtain Pepe's cooperation,
about whether he agreed that the additional observation period was for
his good, or about whether he was made to feel that the courts or the
doctor or neither was on his side [20]. We need to
know more about how these decisions are made before we can make specific
suggestions about improving the decision making practices of Dr. Climo
and his staff.
III. Methods for Describing the Decision Process
We have reached the limit of what we can say about the particular decision
making processes used by Dr. Climo and his staff, given the inevitable
loss of details that occurred in the production of his narrative account.
But in order to say how we could help them — that is,
how the decision making of any psychiatric team in a public mental hospital
might be improved
— we would need to know more about their decision making processes.
In this section, we will describe two kinds of research methods that
would produce the needed information. The first method, naturalistic
observation, focuses on how decisions are made in individual cases by
a group of people. As such, it is useful for studying decisions when
the reasoning processes are relatively intuitive, say at Mode 5 or 6,
given Hammond's [11] suggestion that a focus on cases
is characteristic of these modes. The second method, judgment policy
analysis, studies individuals' policies for judging a set of cases. It
focuses on "variables" and hence is appropriate for judging
clinical reasoning at the relatively analytic Mode 4.
The descriptions produced by these methods will be useful for three purposes:
-
Criticism: a detailed, accurate description of the decision process
allows it to be evaluated, to determine whether it needs to be
improved.
-
Cognitive feedback: the decision makers can be given feedback, in
the form of a description of their decision making process, so
that they can act with more self-awareness and evaluate the process
themselves.
-
Assessment: knowing how well the doctors function at each mode helps
us predict which attempts to give them useful cognitive tools
or decision aids are likely to succeed.
III-A. Naturalistic Observation
First we shall describe procedures of naturalistic observation, derived
from the ethnographic approach of sociology and anthropology. These analyze
concrete cases as they occur in the life of the clinic [21,22].
The ethnographic method attends to the social nature of clinical decision
making. As Climo's paper indicates, the problems that he faces are essentially
social; they are parts of the social situation in which he practices.
Moreover, the recognition and evaluation of alternatives and outcomes
is carried out through social interaction. The unit of analysis is not
a person, such as a clinician, but a case: the problematic matter ostensibly
presented by a patient and requiring a decision by the clinician and
his cohort. The analysis would be concerned with identifying the structure
of social relations impinging on a given case and describing the dynamics
of staff members' interactions as they present and evaluate alternatives
and outcomes. It would reveal how a decision is embedded in a context
of roles and socially distributed knowledge, perspectives, and interests.
The four case reports reveal staff meetings to be the principal settings
of clinical decision making. Presumably, the alternatives and outcomes
that Climo and his fellow staff members take into account are presented
as topics of group discussion, and the process of evaluating and selecting
alternatives is realized through conversational means. He refers to this
collective mode of decision making when he says, in presenting the case
of Pepe, "staff felt unready to make a conclusive diagnostic statement
or offer any definite treatment recommendation" [1,
p 420]. The staff meeting therefore provides an obvious starting point
for an ethnographic analysis of clinical decision making. We might begin
with an analysis of the content and process of social interaction that
constitutes these dialogues.
Data collection for the analysis of social interaction in staff meetings
entails the creation of two complementary sets of records [23].
One set is composed of complete records of the talk and other nonverbal
aspects of the interaction that constitute a meeting, namely video and/or
audio tape recordings and complete transcripts made from these recordings.
These records would enable a detailed analysis of staff members' use
of language and other paralinguistic cues, as well as an analysis of
the structure and substance of their interaction.
Whereas tapes and transcript materials provide the principal data of social
interaction in staff meetings, the analysis of these materials would
be guided by information contained in a second data set. The second set
would be produced through in-depth interviews of the various participants
in the staff meetings. The participants would be treated as informants
who provide their own understandings of the staff meeting. Such a procedure
has been demonstrated [24], showing how the structure
and effectiveness of doctor-patient communication can be assessed by
having doctors and patients independently review, describe, and explain
video tapes of their interactions.
The interviews of the participants would also attend to their respective
professional and clinical backgrounds, their formal and informal relationships
as staff members, and their shared background as collaborative clinicians
in the hospital setting. The relevance of such data has been shown in
studies of staff meetings in a residential care facility for emotionally
disturbed children [25]. What participants said in
staff meetings as they collectively constructed images of patients and
negotiated the meaning of particular facts of a case was related to professional
background (e.g., psychologist vs. social worker) and the organizational
context in which each encountered the child (e.g., an examination room
vs. a classroom).
The analysis of these materials would be concerned with examining two
basic components of the discourse: the substance of the discourse and
the processes of interaction through which it is carried out. The substantive
component is further divided into twin concerns: what the staff members
say to each other and what they talk about with each other.
The first entails attending to language and the details of linguistic
performance, such as lexical choice, intonation, pitch, and rhythm. The
analysis of language could attend to the presence/absence of certain
professional or local-hospital symbols of psychiatric description ("buzz
words"), or it could involve looking for usage indicative of decision
analysis, including its formal vocabulary.
The second substantive concern is with what the staff members talk about.
Language codes a culturally shared reality. Thus, while we attend to
what the members say, their codes, we must also attend to what they talk
about: the set of topics and meanings coded in the talk. Analysis of
topics involves looking through the talk and inferring the underlying
substantive meaning. This analysis relies on information gathered from
the members' own reconstructive reflections on the discourse. This inferential
analysis is particularly relevant in light of the fact that decision
alternatives, outcomes, and utilities may be talked about and understood
by the members without being explicitly presented as such. Collective
decision-making may be carried out in a largely tacit manner.
The process component of analysis also consists of two subcomponents.
One is the basic, "micro" processes of conversational interaction,
including the processes involved in allocating turns to speak or in the
coordinated accomplishment of question-answer couplets (see [26,27]).
The other subcomponent consists of such "macro" processes as
social role enactment and the exercise of power and authority. The first
pertains to processes at work in the unfolding, utterance-to-utterance
order of the discourse; the second pertains to collections of speech
acts and actions that display professional and organizational role responsibilities.
The two levels of social process are integrated. For instance, a social
control tactic may be realized through a subtle control of turn allocations.
Analyses of conversational interaction have shown that people who ask
questions are able to select who speaks next while maintaining the right
to speak subsequent to the other's answer [26]. One
person may seek to direct the construction of a set of alternatives according
to his own professional concerns. His control of the agenda of a group
discussion could be realized through a carefully orchestrated series
of linked questions that lead to a certain conclusion while he maintains
control of the floor. Trial lawyers are trained to be adept at such skills,
while many physicians also display considerable expertise, especially
in their dealings with patients (see the studies compiled by Fisher and
Todd [28]).
The analysis of interaction within a staff meeting also calls for an extended
analysis of the social relations outside it. The matters that are taken
up, and the interests that are pursued, are linked to social relationships
that lie beyond the particular time and space of the meeting. The findings,
hunches, and expectations that staff members may present in reaching
a diagnosis in a particular case are tied to the respective members'
interactions with the patient. Conversely, external relationships are
informed by norms and sets of relevances that are shared in the staff
meeting. For example, interviewing routines that staff members adopt
in their interactions with patients may be informed by their case-reporting
responsibilities in staff meetings.
The staff meeting is therefore the centerpiece of a more comprehensive
analysis of decision making realized in the social interactions of various
parties in a complex social setting. Climo indicates that the meeting
is the locus of his decision making, and that is where we might start
in trying to reconstruct his thorny situation and his decision making
method. We can look inside this event to see the interaction and shared
decision making it contains. But our reconstruction of the situation
and the decision making method also involves a reconstruction of the
wider social setting itself, including the social relations that either
are directly involved in or indirectly impinge on the meeting. The scope
of the inquiry is difficult to predict. If we are to understand a particular
case, however, we might begin with the meeting, move to include relevant
doctor-patient and doctor-judge relationships, and then, as Climo suggested,
take into account the historical relationship of the hospital to various
other social institutions and to the policy at large.
III-B. Judgment Policy Analysis
The second method for observing the decision process is derived from the
judgment and decision research tradition of psychology. It focuses on
variables; that is, it develops a description of the doctor's decision
policy in terms of how the decision depends on the attributes of the
situation. Instead of describing how the doctor considers the concrete
details of a single situation, this method describes his or her decision
policy at a more abstract level, in terms of how variations in the key
attributes would affect the decision. The description has these elements:
-
A set of attributes, dimensions, or cues that are important in the
decision.
-
A method of measuring each of these variables.
-
A description of how the variables are aggregated or organized to
arrive at a decision.
The aggregation process descriptions typically assume that the model has
a "weighted average" organizing principle. In studying clinical
decision making, this assumption is justified by (a) Hammond's [7,8]
theory that intuition involves such a weighted averaging process (note
that his theory explicitly opposes the oft-stated assumption that intuition
involves configural combination of cues) in combination with (b) our
assumption that the doctors are operating at Mode 5 or 6, the intuitive
end of the cognitive continuum. The aggregation process can then be represented
with a model of the form
where the decision variable D is a weighted average of the impacts
of the dimensions, and each dimension i is measured on scale Xi and
multiplied by weight Wi.
We shall describe three procedures that can be used to find numbers for
such a model. These vary in difficulty and also in the accuracy of the
parameters they produce.
Self-reports. The first procedure is to ask doctors to report
the relative weights they use, using a convenient scale (e.g., Edward's "SMART" procedure
[29]). Although this is simple for the researcher to
administer and takes little of the doctors' time, to do it accurately
would require great sophistication and abstract reasoning on the doctors'
part. People's self-reports of weights are not particularly precise [30],
although the decrement in predictive accuracy may not be severe [31].
However, self-report accuracy would be particularly difficult to attain
for decisions that are usually handled intuitively, where the doctors
do not routinely talk about the situations in terms of variables. The
procedure is useful, however, for getting doctors to think qualitatively
about the relative importance of different aspects of the decision situation
without completely ignoring the less important dimensions, and it thus
represents an advance over Climo's reported decision method.
Selective Focus on Variables. The second procedure is to present
a detailed description of a decision situation and to vary each attribute
in turn over its entire possible range, to determine the effect of this
variation on the doctors' evaluation. (This is similar to the procedures
of Keeney [32] and Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt [33];
see also Meehl [34]).
Compared to the first procedure, this procedure takes more of the doctors'
time and requires mathematical sophistication on the part of the researcher.
On the other hand, accuracy at this task would not in theory require
as much sophistication on the doctors' part. Stewart and Ely [35],
however, have demonstrated a flaw in a similar procedure: people's reported
weights are insensitive to changes in the range the dimension is varied
over. Therefore, though demanding less sophistication from the doctors,
this procedure still probably requires reasoning that is too abstract
for them to deal with accurately. Consequently, the numbers derived
from this procedure should not be trusted; specifically, they should
not be used in a policy that stands in the doctor's stead. Nonetheless,
this procedure can make doctors take a careful, variable-oriented look
at their decision situation.
Judging Hypothetical Cases. In the third procedure a set of hypothetical
cases is constructed to vary systematically on the key attributes; the
doctor judges each case, and statistical procedures relating his judgments
to the cues are used to produce the best-fit parameters for the model.
The set of attributes should include the relevant social and institutional
factors, in addition to "clinical" variables. Determining the
set may require the researcher to interview a number of doctors about
what they pay attention to in these situations or to observe the decision
process directly.
This procedure requires more work than the other two procedures. The doctor
must judge each of a large number of cases. The cases are concrete, however,
so no special sophistication is required of the doctor for accurate response.
The researcher must construct the case materials and do the statistical
analysis. The advantage of this procedure is that the resulting model
represents the doctor's judgment policy accurately over the space of
possible cases spanned by the set of hypothetical cases. (If one is concerned
about the possibility of nonlinear cue use or nonlinear aggregation principles,
one can use more elaborate statistics (e.g., [36,37]).
A possible disadvantage of this method is that the hypothetical nature
of the cases encourages the doctor to take too abstract an attitude toward
them. Hence the judgment policy description may reflect the doctor's
cool [38], even bored [39], reasoning,
while if faced with real decisions the doctor might be passionately involved.
Yet the judgment model is an accurate description of the doctor's
cool cognition, and as such it may be useful for giving perspective in
an upsetting case.
These three procedures are not equally useful for our purposes of criticism,
cognitive feedback, and assessment. For criticizing the doctor's policy
by comparing a descriptive model of it with a prescription, the third
procedure is best, because its description is more accurate. When difficulty
for doctor and researcher is an issue, however, the easier procedures
may give a rough indication of problems with the policy.
For cognitive feedback, the doctors could learn little about their decision
policies from the first procedure, since they supply the parameters directly.
The third procedure would give more accurate feedback than the second.
For assessment of the doctor's ability to reason in terms of variables,
any of the three procedures could be used. In addition to describing
the doctor's policy, the third procedure measures his or her consistency;
this is useful because a doctor who applies a policy consistently is
probably able to profit from instructions and techniques, particularly
if they are accompanied by cognitive feedback.
IV. Improving Decision Making in Thorny Psychiatric Situations
Determining the best approach for improving the decision making processes
of psychiatrists faced with the kind of difficult decision that Climo
has described may be conceived as a three-step process: observation,
evaluation, and assessment.
IV-A. Observation of the Decision Process
The researchers must find out exactly how the decisions are made, using,
for example, the methods reviewed in Section III, as appropriate. In
addition, it will be useful to determine at what mode of cognition those
who play a role in the decision are functioning. We recognize that the
doctor is capable of thinking at each of a number of cognitive modes,
and functions, if only at a rudimentary level, at most of these some
of the time. The level of analyticity of his or her current cognitive
activity is partially determined by a number of factors in the situation:
by the kind of information that is available (accurate or not), by the
kind of control available (amount of chance or uncontrollability), by
the quality of reasoning that is expected of the doctor, or by the kinds
of cognitive tools that are available and that the practitioners are
trained, motivated, and institutionally supported to use.
IV-B. Evaluation of the Decision Process
The researchers must determine whether there is need for improvement,
as we did with Climo's practice in Section II — except that it would
be necessary to work with a more detailed description of the decision
process. The process might be evaluated with respect to a variety of
standards: for example, by comparison with the kinds of reasoning the
law sanctions [6], with the norms of decision theory,
with psychiatric standards pertaining to the therapeutic use of the decision
process [20], with empirical standards of accuracy
in judgment, or with outcome studies.
IV-C. Assessment of the Improvement Options
The available intervention options should be assessed in terms of their
need, feasibility, and likely success. To determine the best mode of
intervention, researchers need to answer the following questions.
-
What degree of guidance is appropriate? Should researchers simply
give feedback, showing the decision makers descriptions of their
decision processes? Or should we tell them how to change their
practices in order to make their decisions better? This choice
depends on whether it would be clear to the psychiatrists how
to improve their practice once their behavior has been reflected
to them. Some of the normative grounds against which we may measure
their practice may be unfamiliar, and so the doctors would need
guidance. In some cases, no improvement may be possible without
the adoption of new practices in which the doctors would need
extensive tutoring. On the other hand, in some situations simply
reflecting the decision makers' behavior to them may reveal something
that they know immediately how to correct. Here our choice might
be whether to hold the mirror for them, or to let them hold it
for themselves; perhaps they can be taught simple yet effective
descriptive techniques that can be used independently of the
researchers.
-
At what cognitive mode should the intervention be made, whether
it be feedback or explicit guidance? We assume that most participants
use reasoning from a range of modes on the cognitive continuum:
their unjustified intuitive reactions (Mode 6), their publicly
justified case-focused reasoning, such as referring to other
similar cases (Mode 5), and variable-focused reasoning with or
without attempts at measurement (Mode 4). We must determine at
what level to target an intervention, taking into account the
level of the current decision processes and whether the staff
is ready to handle feedback or techniques at a more analytical
level.
Feedback at the Mode 5 level of cognition would involve
explaining the findings of the case-focused, descriptive analysis,
as provided by the method described in Section III-A. As this
type of analysis refers to a theory of how decisions are made
as well as to a theory of how social interactions produce such
decisions, the decision makers would surely receive much insight
into their own decision processes. They could evaluate their
processes and choose to act in a way they judge to be better,
helped perhaps by the researcher's continued monitoring.
Feedback at Mode 4 would involve explaining the findings
of the variable-focused descriptive methodology of Section III-B,
for example, or of a description of their behavior in terms of
subjective expected utility theory [40]. Use
of such feedback, in combination with a convincing argument that
the person's judgments should make different use of
the variables (e.g., that it would be better to put different
weights on the attributes of the decision situation [41]
or that the decision maker's choices violate the axioms of decision
theory [42]), has proven effective at inducing
people to change their judgment strategies.
Active intervention at the Mode 5 level of cognition would
involve teaching the decision makers to use vocabulary that makes
explicit the considerations that decision theory would require
them to attend to: the concepts of options, events, and outcomes,
and the idea of measuring and comparing the uncertainty of events
and the value of outcomes (see [19]). The use
of such concepts, even in the absence of explicit measurement
of uncertainties or values, probably contributes to good decision
making [5].
Active intervention at Mode 4 could involve teaching
techniques for aiding judgment or inference, using some form
of subjective measurement of variables. For example, the decision
makers could be taught to use decision analysis with subjective
probability and utility assessments [43], nonstatistical
analytical techniques [44], an empirically
derived rule for choosing the best therapy [45],
or "bootstrapping," which is the use of a model, derived
from their own judgments, that captures the essence of their
judgment policy and discards the noise due to their inconsistent
use of the policy, thus producing better judgments than they
make on their own [46].
-
Which techniques should be used with which members of the decision
making team? Different people, with different abilities, will
bear the main responsibility for different parts of the decision
process. We must take into account which part of the decision
process might bring the most gain, if it were to be improved.
But we must also consider the ability, motivation, training,
and role expectations of the person who is responsible for that
part of the decision process. Further, these considerations are
interdependent: one would not wish to teach one capable and motivated
person to measure probabilities in a sophisticated manner if
it were not possible to measure utilities, or if the people in
a position to assess utilities were not willing to do so. Finally,
one person or a coalition may have the power to determine the
details of the decision process. Giving others feedback or teaching
others new techniques may be wasted unless this power holder
supports the interventions and the required changes in the decision
process.
Just as with the introduction of specific techniques, in choosing the
general mode of cognition at which to intervene with a group of decision
makers it is important to be sensitive to what is feasible in the context
of the entire decision making team. One should not automatically push
for the most analytical of the available techniques. Even if some participants
are capable and motivated to learn Mode 4 techniques, one must anticipate
how this will fit in with the whole decision process, that is, how well
the techniques will be supported by existing or possibly reorganized
social relations in the group. Getting all staff members to use the vocabulary
of decision theory in an informal way might produce more improvement
and less resistance than teaching a few members to use sophisticated
techniques and expecting the group to use the information they produce.
V. Conclusion
We have criticized the decision making practice of Dr. Climo and his staff,
as described in his paper, explained two types of method for describing
decision processes in detail, and outlined how to choose among a number
of general approaches for helping doctors faced with thorny psychiatric
decisions. How can the methods and techniques we have reviewed help a
psychiatrist attain the goals listed in the introduction of this paper?
-
An appropriate, principled use of decision theory, whether this be
the use of its vocabulary at Mode 5 or of its measurement techniques
at Mode 4, would increase the likelihood of finding the best
decision.
-
Guiding one's practice by a decision policy derived by using the
descriptive methods of Section III-B would increase the consistency
of the decision process over the class of decisions that the
policy or model applies to.
-
If the decision process uses decision theoretic concepts accurately
and appropriately, these offer a powerful justification, should
the decision be criticized.
-
An accurate description of the decision making process, whether produced
by case-focused (Section III-A) or variable-focused (Section
III-B) description techniques, can be used to teach others how
to use it.
-
Evaluation of the decision process and proposed changes in it is
feasible when descriptions are available for comparison with
normative theories.
-
The vocabulary of rational decision making can be used for communicating
both with patients and among staff members, and for teaching
patients. In order not to confuse and alienate patients, however,
it might be better to explain to most patients at the level of
Mode 5 rather than Mode 4.
Thus the ideas we have reviewed for describing and improving the decision
making process in the public psychiatric hospital can contribute to the
attainment of each of the goals a psychiatrist would have for the decision
making process.
Progress in this area requires the participation of practitioners as well
as researchers. We thank Dr. Climo for taking the risk of explaining
his difficult situation and his method for dealing with it. We hope that
our work will stimulate practitioners to study their decision processes
and seek methods for improving them, and stimulate researchers to develop
relatively intuitive techniques that promote practice consistent with
decision theory in real, thorny situations.
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