An Offensive Against Bioterrorism
October 4, 2001 Page: A18 Section: Letters
Our nation's current vulnerability to bioterrorism has implications beyond
simply accelerating public health measures at home. No impregnable,
purely vaccine- and drug-based bioterrorist shield is possible any
more than an impregnable star wars missile defense.
Just as the latter needs to be supplemented with diplomatic and military
measures designed to prevent or if necessary to overthrow dictatorships
manufacturing nuclear devices for terrorist export, so we need to
prioritize our diplomatic and military efforts to stop or, if necessary,
to eliminate those regimes intent on manufacturing bioterrorist weapons
of mass destruction for terrorist use.
Most urgently this means conducting the public debate as to whether to
target Saddam Hussein's Baath party regime in Iraq in terms which
do not follow the cold war liberal (hands off) versus conservative
(intervene) divide. For this debate to result in a rational policy
decision valid intelligence is needed as to his current and projected
bioterrorist weapon capability. We also must avoid being blinded
by wishful thinking or modeling the current conflict based upon our
most recent one, the long Cold War with the Soviet Union where we
can be seen as having won "by waiting them out" under the
umbrella of mutually assured destruction. In the current instance,
time may not be on our side. MAD doesn't work with either religious
(the Taliban) or secular (Hussein's Baath party) cults. The argument
that we will only be targets of bioterrorism by way of retaliation
has never held true as far as Hussein's modus operandi. He, as the
Nazi cult in its genocidal program against the Jews during the Shoah,
has committed mass murder whenever he can get away with it.
While delay in offensive action may be helpful in boosting our domestic
bioterrorism defense and response capabilities, if the history of
weapons development is any guide, it is even more likely to work
to the advantage of bioterrorist-cultivating regimes by allowing
more time for the manufacture and dispersal of ever more potent bioterrorist
weapons.
Harold J. Bursztajn, MD
Associate clinical professor of psychiatry
Harvard Medical School
Cambridge